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ABSTRACT 
This thesis addresses how the United States national security system better 
protects the nation given that twenty-first century threats are borderless, adaptive, and 
complex.  To best respond to these new and ever changing threats, the United States’ 
security system needs the ability to quickly translate covert intelligence into law 
enforcement action, creating both a proactive and reactive response to twenty-first 
century threats.  This paper proposes the following recommendations to make the nation 
safe:  1)  combine domestic intelligence and law enforcement functions and formally 
create a national security organization—the FBI; 2)  create a new national security 
doctrine which defines national security, domestic security, domestic intelligence, law 
enforcement, and homeland security for the twenty-first century; and 3)  change the 
mindset and culture of the current national security players so as to transform the system 
into a megacommunity. 
It is acknowledged that it will take time to achieve these recommendations, as it 
has taken decades to build the walls of today’s national security system.  Within these 
walls lie individual stove-piped agencies that compete as opposed to being a community 
of networked, interconnected, and decentralized agencies working in unison.  The 
national security system needs to undergo dramatic reform, which will require the 
national security system players to learn, unlearn, and relearn.  But the stakes have never 
been higher. 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In order to best protect the nation in the twenty-first century, the national security 
system must interact to its fullest capacity, developing a seamless transition between law 
enforcement and intelligence efforts to more effectively address the threats of today and 
tomorrow.  In today’s threat environment, known state actors have been replaced by 
globalized insurgencies, many of whom believe that their enemies are the United States 
and other western civilizations.  Rules of engagement are nonexistent as civilians are as 
much a target as military and government entities.  Since 9/11, these shadowy enemies 
have continued to silently creep onto U.S. soil and lie hidden within U.S. open 
communities.  As a result, today’s national security system must do more.  It must now 
and forever ensure maximum and simultaneous leveraging of both its domestic law 
enforcement and intelligence capabilities to guarantee quick translation of covert 
intelligence into action; thus, creating a more agile response and ability to keep pace with 
today’s ever-changing threats.  But arguably, restructuring the system to look different is 
not a complete solution.  As today’s threats have evolved, so too should the security 
system.  In order to achieve the necessary reform, it is equally important that the security 
system think and act differently through learning, unlearning and relearning (Toffler, 
year).  Unquestionably, since 9/11, the threat environment, expectations, and margins of 
error have significantly changed for all of the national security system players and 
stakeholders.  The safety of the nation depends, in part, on how quickly and effectively 
this system responds to today’s globally driven security threats with an equally proactive 
and reactive response.   
It is noteworthy that almost nine years after 9/11 national security experts still 
ponder whether the United States should create a new and separate domestic intelligence 
agency.  However, framing the question in this way creates two presumptions:  (1) that 
the separation of functions is best and (2) restructuring the national system alone is 
sufficient to address today’s globally driven threats.  But one cannot help but remember 
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the question posed long ago in the famous Wendy’s commercial, “Where’s the beef?”  
Although generally, it is undisputed that the United States national security system needs 
both a law enforcement and intelligence capability.  However, the debate continues, 
given the complexity of the United States security landscape, concerning whether it is 
best to separate domestic intelligence and law enforcement by creating a new domestic 
intelligence agency or to combine these two functions in one agency, thus creating the 
National Security Organization.  In choosing either one of these options, the national 
security system will look different, but is this enough?  Remarkably, this ongoing debate 
lacks an equally robust discussion about the need for either the new domestic intelligence 
agency or the National Security Organization to think and act differently in order to most 
effectively operate in what is now described as a new world order—one driven by 
technology and globalization which has made it more interconnected and interdependent 
than ever before (Gerencser, Lee, Napolitano, & Kelly, 2008, p. 33).  Answering all three 
questions—how the national security system looks, acts and thinks differently to best 
protect the nation against twenty-first century threats remain today’s most critical 
unanswered questions.  As has been noted, “every organization needs help 
comprehending the challenges and opportunities that come with change,” and the national 
security system is no exception (Toffler Associates, n.d.).  
In an effort to determine best practices for the United States, it is instructive to 
comparatively study the national security systems of distinct security apparatus in two 
different countries—on one hand, the United Kingdom, which maintains separate 
intelligence and law enforcement functions, and on the other, France, which more 
formally combines these functions.  Beyond their structures, determining how these 
services think and act is highly relevant to the outcome of this research. 
What is not in question throughout this research is how the world today looks, 
thinks and acts differently.  As President Obama acknowledged in May 2009, “the 
challenges of the twenty-first century are increasingly unconventional and transnational, 
and therefore demand a response that effectively integrates all aspects of American 
power” (Hsu, 2009). It is worth noting that President Obama’s reference to “all aspects of 
American power” seems to imply a “grain to bread” approach (Treverton, 2008b, p. 71).  
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This would suggest the national security system needs to expand well beyond its initial 
breadth, created in 1947, and include state, local, and private sector related security 
players.  This research will explore who are today’s security actors; the national security 
system has not undergone a comprehensive reform since its inception.   
Although this research began with exploring the question as to whether the United 
States should separate or combine domestic intelligence and law enforcement functions, 
additional critical issues emerged—namely, whether the national security apparatus needs 
to think and act differently as well to better protect the nation against twenty-first century 
threats.  What became apparent during the initial stages of this research was the need to 
question whether or not the traditional and established mindset and linear way of thinking 
is a death sentence to any reform of the national security system, given the speed and 
complexity of today’s threat environment.  In other words, is there a need for a revolution 
within the security system that “breaks china” by developing new ways of thinking which 
move away from traditional, linear thinking and more towards a non-sequential, lateral, 
agile, and unified way of thinking, thus creating a more resilient and adaptive national 
security apparatus (De Bono, 2009)? What became important to consider in this research 
is how this new way of thinking might better guide and shape the security system and 
either a newly created domestic intelligence agency under a separate model or a National 
Security Organization under a combined model.   
In conducting research to address these questions, it was determined there are 
gaps within the currently available reference materials.  More importantly, the existing 
literature regarding national security reform is significantly devoid of reference material 
pertaining to a need to think and act differently in the twenty-first century.  One of the 
goals of this thesis is to fill these gaps by providing additional data to draw conclusions 
which allow the system to more confidently address the problems posed as now, almost 
nine years after the fatal attacks on 9/11, the system remains in turmoil.  To quiet the 
unrest and lead to a complete transformation of the national security system to better face 
the twenty-first century threat environment, solutions are overdue. 
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B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
To effectively address twenty-first century, globally-driven threats, the United 
States needs the ability to quickly translate covert intelligence into law enforcement 
action, creating both a proactive and reactive response.   
1. In an effort to enhance the United States’ ability to quickly translate covert 
intelligence into law enforcement action to better protect the nation against 
twenty-first century globally-driven threats, should the United States 
separate domestic intelligence and law enforcement functions by creating 
a new domestic agency, or combine these functions, thereby officially 
creating a National Security Organization?  Although there is little 
disagreement as to the value of seamlessly integrating intelligence and law 
enforcement functions, there is dramatic disagreement as to how the 
United States ensures this seamless integration.  
2. Is there a need to define the terms national security, domestic security, 
domestic intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland security in a new 
security doctrine to ensure a common language and clear and accepted 
definitions? 
3. Whether the United States chooses to separate or combine domestic 
intelligence and law enforcement functions to protect the nation in the 
twenty-first century, how does the new domestic intelligence agency or 
the National Security Organization need to look, think, and act to best 
address twenty-first century threats?  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The scope of this literature review focused on: identifying sources germane to 
understanding the basis and relevancy of the current national security system; defining 
domestic intelligence, security, and law enforcement in the twenty-first century; national 
security systems and approaches employed by the United Kingdom and France; and, 
finally, new and revolutionary ways to look, think, and act in the twenty-first century.  
The sources identified fell into seven categories: (1) FBI history, (2) FBI strategy 
and policy documents, (3) national homeland security strategy documents, (4) today’s 
national security system and United States intelligence and the domestic intelligence 
debate, (5) other western intelligence/security services, (6) post-9/11 public and private 
studies, and (7) strategic planning and leadership in the “new world order.”  The core 
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sources within these categories have been produced in the aftermath of 9/11 attacks and 
include a range of homeland security strategies as well as post-9/11 fact-finding studies 
by the 9/11 Commission, Senate and House Intelligence Committees, and the Presidential 
advisory panels to assess domestic response capabilities for terrorism involving weapons 
of mass destruction. Sources also included studies conducted by think-tanks on 
organizing the national homeland security community and the role of the FBI, including 
Rand Corporation, the Markle Foundation, the Brookings Institution, and the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies. Further sources were books written by prominent 
intelligence and academic professionals regarding the characteristics and features of U.S. 
and other western intelligence programs.  In discussing the similarities and differences 
between these services the books provided thought provoking material on new ways to 
think in today’s globally-driven world and how to affect change in society and 
organizations.   
As background, reference material pertaining to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s (FBI) 100-year history was researched to include such works as The FBI, 
A Centennial History, 1908–2008 (FBI, 2008), wherein it is clearly articulated how the 
FBI has consistently adapted to ever changing threats.  This book was relied upon in 
conjunction with the FBI’s open source website to showcase the threat environment of 
the last century and do two things:  compare and contrast the past, present and future 
threat environments; and articulate why the reactive, case-driven model was effective 
until now.  As the book, The FBI, A Centennial History, 1908–2008 was recently 
published by the Department of Justice, it has inherent credibility.  Specifically, this book 
critically identifies how, throughout the last 10 decades, the United States threat 
environment has changed and describes how in response the FBI appropriately evolved 
and adapted to these changes.  Examples of these changes include a range of challenges 
which included the 1920s and 1930s gang wars and threats; the 1940s threats from the 
escalation of war, subversion, sabotage, and espionage; the 1950s threat from communist 
subversion within the U.S., to the 1960s civil rights challenges, to the 1970s organized 
crime threat; the 1980s “Year of the Spy” (FBI, n.d.(c)) and illegal drug trade threats; the  
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1990s first U.S. homeland terrorism attack, followed by the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the 
continued threat from terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction.  (FBI, 2008) 
Notably, the 9/11 attacks created a new measurement of failure and a need for a 
new level of evolution within the FBI—one that required the FBI to create an agency 
within an agency. This established the FBI as not only a premier law enforcement agency 
but also equally a premier intelligence agency.  This call for change demanded the United 
States establish, through the FBI, a reactive and proactive response to national security 
threats.  As the 9/11 Commission noted, one such attack such as that on September 11, 
2001 becomes painfully unacceptable and a new measurement of failure (National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States [9/11 Commission], 2004, p. 
xv).  As the threat environment changed forever on 9/11, so did the responsibilities of the 
FBI.  In addition, this event sparked the debate that continues today—whether or not 
beyond the FBI, the United States needs a new domestic intelligence agency to better 
address terrorism and other twenty-first century threats.  Amidst the debate regarding 
United States’ domestic intelligence, the bar was raised on this day, especially for the FBI 
whose role as the nation’s primary law enforcement and domestic intelligence agency 
came into question.  Specifically, whether the FBI retains this role going into the future 
depends on whether or not it can transform from a reactive, case-driven agency to a 
proactive, threat-based intelligence agency with a preventive emphasis. (Baird, Daalder, 
& Falkenrath, 2004, p. 8).   
The FBI historical literature, which documents the agency’s last 100 years, is not 
surprisingly controversial but welcomed as the material offers a well-documented look 
inside the agency.  Specifically, The FBI, A Centennial History, 1908–2008, discusses in 
detail the last 10 decades of the FBI’s actions, investigations, and changes (FBI, 2008). 
With an insider’s accuracy, the book reveals how the FBI has made significant changes to 
address today’s threats.  But as its title suggests, the book is a historical work with a 
focus on the past, not the future.  Imagining what the FBI will look like in the next 100 
years is a rather difficult task; but, unquestionably, as it has done before, it will continue 
to evolve to address ever-changing threats.      
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Critical to this research was the development of an understanding as to how the 
FBI has and continues to address the post-9/11 threat environment.  Beyond the historical 
reference material, the literature review included numerous FBI strategy and policy 
documents that demonstrate how the FBI created a multi-pronged strategy that has 
continued to evolve over the last nine years.  This multi-pronged strategy is contained in 
not one, but three major documents, including: The FBI Top Priorities Report, The 2004–
2009 Strategic Plan, and The 2007–2008 Strategic Execution Team (SET) Initiative—
Enhancing Field Intelligence Operations.  These documents remain undisputed, but 
because they were produced internally by the FBI, there is no external access, which 
might generate criticism. What becomes crystal clear upon review is that the overarching 
goal of these strategy documents is to strike a balance between the national security and 
criminal programs of the FBI and between short-term tactical efforts and longer-term 
strategic initiatives.   
The intent of the Priorities Report was to ensure the FBI’s resources were aligned 
against the nation’s top investigative priorities.  Though this document advised the 
collective FBI what order it should investigate its jurisdictional matters, it did not provide 
a compliance mechanism to ensure these priorities were being followed.  The next 
document, the 2004–2009 Strategic Plan, articulated a strategic vision built upon these 
top investigative priorities and provided a system of management to ensure the priorities 
were being met.  Ultimately, this document served as a vision and policy document—
identifying broad, strategic goals, and objectives matched against the FBI’s mission.  
Additionally, it included commendable goals such as the development of long-term 
forecasting capabilities, and alignment of operations and capabilities in response to the 
threat environment (FBI, n.d. (d), pp. 12, 23). The most recently produced strategy 
document, The SET Initiative, is the FBI’s most recent effort to develop and standardize 
its intelligence functions and implement a threat-based, intelligence-driven process.  
Within this document, there is a collaborative effort between headquarters and field 
office personnel.  SET’s goal is to “accelerate the development of the FBI’s intelligence 
capabilities” (FBI, 2008, p. 9); this has been underway since July 2007.  To date, the 
initiative has established and implemented a standard field intelligence group in all of the 
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FBI’s 56 field offices and established new processes, including domain management, 
collection management, and distinct human intelligence collection at both the field and 
headquarters levels. (FBI, 2008, p. 10). As a result of formalizing collection management, 
domain awareness, and human intelligence (HUMINT) processes, it can be argued that 
through SET the FBI has made considerable progress in its intelligence performance, 
making the agency more intelligence-driven and threat-based today than it was even two 
years ago.  For instance, field office personnel are not only developing a more 
comprehensive understanding of local threats within their area of responsibility 
(domain)—what drives, triggers, initiates these threats—but also transnational threats and 
how these threats impact their domain.  However, these are fundamental changes to the 
way the FBI, as a traditional law enforcement organization, has historically conducted 
business.  As such, these changes will take time to more fully develop, grow, and mature.  
The SET initiative planted the seeds but work remains for the FBI as it develops into a 
more proactive and preventative organization.    
In conclusion, the FBI has developed an extensive array of strategies and policies 
to effectuate significant change towards evolving the agency into an intelligence driven 
organization, but as the saying goes, the “proof is in the pudding.”  Policy and strategy 
alone will not achieve this monumental task.  Ultimately, all major organizational 
transformations require significant cultural and mindset changes; the FBI’s 
transformation is no exception—success will lie in the will of its people.  Although the 
FBI, as evidenced by these documents, has undergone extensive and ongoing change 
since its inception to adapt to changing threat environments, there is no greater task than 
the one at hand.  But this task extends beyond the FBI and involves the need for reform 
within the entire national security system.   
In looking beyond the FBI in determining how the national security system should 
look, think, and act to best protect the nation against twenty-first century threats, it is 
informative to review the most significant homeland security related strategies produced 
since September 11, 2001.  These materials include 2002 National Strategy for Homeland 
Security, 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security, Joint Intelligence, The National 
Strategy for Maritime Security, The 9/11 Commission Report, The 2006 National Security 
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Strategy of the United States of America, and the 2003 National Strategy for Combating 
Terrorism.  As the concept of homeland security, outside of the military enterprise, is still 
relatively new, these are unique and rather broad policy documents that offer limited 
guidance as to how these strategies are to be implemented and achieved.  Because the 
notion of homeland security is new and its definition continues to evolve, these 
documents are fluid and serve as cornerstones of the U.S. homeland security enterprise.  
The early editions, written on the heels of 9/11, had a strong emphasis on 
counterterrorism; however, as the events of 9/11 get further away, the focus has shifted to 
a broader definition of national security threats to include an all-hazards approach.   
The commonality amongst these and the other strategy documents, including the 
FBI documents, is the recognition of a need to develop an integrated national and 
homeland security approach.  The Joint Publication 2–0 (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007) and 
Maritime Strategy (White House, 2005, p. ii) documents recognized the value of joint 
intelligence operations between the military and multinational partners, other government 
agencies, and intergovernmental and nongovernment organizations.  These doctrines are 
based on the principle that fully integrated operations, plans, and intelligence better 
postures national security agencies to fulfill their missions.  Collectively, these national 
strategies, much like their FBI equivalents, are not disputed as they promote solutions to 
better protect the nation, which is aligned with all schools of thoughts.  The lingering 
question is how the collective government defines homeland security as opposed to 
domestic security, federal law enforcement, and domestic intelligence.  These strategy 
documents lack a common language and clear and accepted definitions of homeland 
security, domestic security, and domestic intelligence—a gap this research seeks to fill.   
In the aftermath of 9/11, many inquiries and investigations were initiated to 
identify vulnerabilities within the current national security system and make 
recommendations to address these vulnerabilities.  The undisputed leader of the pack is 
the 9/11 Commission.  Within the FBI, the 9/11 Commission recommendations to a great 
degree have become a defining strategy for the post-9/11 environment.  Based upon these 
recommendations, the FBI created a National Security Branch for the oversight of 
Counterterrorism, Counterintelligence, and Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs, thus 
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establishing, as the commission urged, a specialized and integrated national security 
workforce (9/11 Commission, 2004, pp. 425–426). But one area of great debate that 
began on September 12, 2001, and continues still, is whether a new domestic intelligence 
agency should be created.  The commission came out against this proposal but failed to 
define the term domestic intelligence and failed to discuss whether it should be separated 
or combined with law enforcement (p. 425).  In regards to captioned research, there 
seems to still be a significant amount of room for additional study concerning whether 
there should be a new domestic intelligence agency created separately from law 
enforcement or whether the capabilities should be combined within an agency charged 
with law enforcement responsibilities.   
Developing an understanding of the United States intelligence community (USIC) 
and the methods, means, and intelligence processes the components of the community 
employ is critical to answering whether the United States should separate or combine 
intelligence and law enforcement functions.  To develop this understanding, captioned 
research relied on publications written by professional intelligence experts and 
academics.  Specifically, this research relied extensively upon Lowenthal’s (2006) book, 
Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, and Sims and Gerber’s (2008) book, Transforming 
U.S. Intelligence.  
Lowenthal (2006) provides considerable detail regarding the structure, mission, 
scope, status, and gaps of the U.S. intelligence enterprise.  Though there seems to be a 
universal agreement that the United States needs to develop a refined domestic 
intelligence capability; there have been and continues to be numerous debates across the 
public and private sectors as to how this should be achieved.  Lowenthal unquestionably 
provides an accurate description of the features and elements of an intelligence service 
with an overseas focus but provides little advice regarding the features pertinent to a 
domestic intelligence agency, thus creating a gap this research seeks to address.  Drawing 
a difference between intelligence and law enforcement, Lowenthal (2006, p. 7) asserts 
that intelligence is not as much about truth as it is about proximate reality—situational 
awareness.   
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This statement highlights a significant quandary for the FBI because throughout 
its history, it has had a focus towards seeking truth through the collection of evidence to 
support a prosecution.  And as the FBI remains charged with the primary responsibility 
for domestic intelligence collection, according to Lowenthal’s statement, it is now 
incumbent upon the FBI to draw a distinction between its collection activities to seek the 
truth in support of a prosecution and its collection activities to develop situational 
awareness.  This presents a serious challenge, as efforts to collect the truth versus efforts 
to collection for situational awareness are two very distinct activities requiring very 
distinct skill sets.  As will be discussed later, Thomas Pink in his book, A Whole New 
Mind, would further define these skill sets between the left brain and right brain 
characteristics.  Finding a proper balance between the two skill sets is arguably one of the 
greatest contemporary challenges facing the national security system.   
Within Lowenthal’s book, the author provides a vivid, comprehensive, and, thus, 
valuable description of the intelligence process, including planning and direction, 
collection, processing, exploitation, analysis, production, and dissemination (Lowenthal, 
2006, p. 65).  The literature that focuses on the debate surrounding how the United States 
should build a domestic intelligence capability is limited because it begins and ends with 
discussing where this capacity should be built: in a new agency or within an existing 
agency, thus putting the cart in front of the horse.  A better starting point would be to 
identify the critical characteristics, features, and elements of a premier domestic 
intelligence agency, which might well generate viable solutions regarding the “where” 
question.  
Sims and Gerber (2008) propose the construction of a domestic security 
intelligence corps that is part of the FBI but under explicit direction of U.S. intelligence 
leadership.  This proposal seems to suggest an appreciation for the interdependent 
relationship between law enforcement and domestic intelligence, but it creates a situation 
where in the FBI is reporting to two directors, which presents another set of challenges 
the authors fail to fully address.  Sims and Gerber believe this separation is necessary to 
promote better cohesion between the FBI, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and other 
U.S. intelligence and homeland agencies.  This research explored the various proposals 
 12
put forth by these intelligence experts in an attempt to best answer the driving question—
whether or not the United States should separate or combine domestic intelligence and 
law enforcement functions, and whether or not the answer lies in the ability of the FBI to 
shift from a reactive, case-driven approach to a more proactive, threat-driven approach.  
As with Lowenthal (2006), authors Sims and Gerber lack any viable discussion regarding 
how an agency with combined domestic intelligence and law enforcement functions 
would think and act differently in an effort to best address twenty-first century security 
threats. 
Speaking to the 9/11 Commission, then National Security Adviser to President 
George W. Bush, Condoleezza Rice exclaimed, “America is allergic to domestic 
intelligence” (Sims & Gerber, 2005, p. 206). The statement was a bold and daring 
commentary on the American public’s capacity to endure domestic intelligence activities 
which inherently encompass a broad range of proactive and secretive collection to 
address the nation’s greatest threats.  Striking a balance between domestic security and 
Constitutional rights of privacy lies at the center of the debate as to whether the United 
States should separate domestic intelligence from law enforcement.  Proponents of the 
combined approach argue that joining domestic intelligence with a law enforcement 
agency inherently protects against over intrusive domestic collection.  In contrast, 
opponents of the combined approach argue that the activities associated with domestic 
intelligence differ too greatly from law enforcement, which focuses almost exclusively on 
collection of evidence not intelligence.  It is questionable whether or not one agency can 
expertly execute both activities.    
In a Brookings Institute commentary, Rights, Liberties, and Security: 
Recalibrating the Balance after September 11, Stuart Taylor calls for a lively national 
debate and congressional action to conduct a reassessment of the civil liberties rules that 
govern domestic intelligence collection (2003, p. 1). He indicates the need to penetrate 
secret terrorist cells in order to disrupt terrorism demands a systematic reassessment of 
civil liberties, arguing that civil libertarians have underestimated the need for broader 
investigative powers and have exaggerated the dangers to fundamental liberties (p. 2). 
These sources demonstrate the broad scope and range of opinions and concerns regarding 
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how the United States security apparatus moves forward.  They also highlight the 
ongoing debates about which agency should be primarily responsible for domestic 
security and how to broaden domestic intelligence collection powers while protecting 
civil liberties.  Although the scarcity of available material on domestic intelligence and 
security created a struggle for captioned research, it did support the need for additional 
research on these topics.   
The Rand Corporation has attempted to fill the gaps previously identified through 
the production of several significant and lengthy documents concerning United States 
intelligence and, more specifically, the domestic intelligence debate.  A recently released 
study by Treverton (2008a), Assessing Counterterrorism: Focused Domestic Intelligence, 
focuses specifically on the two proposals squarely within this research: (1) assemble parts 
of an existing agency to build a separate domestic intelligence agency; or (2) build a 
domestic intelligence capability within an existing agency such as the FBI or the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Treverton’s study makes no recommendation 
but offers the pros and cons of each of these proposals (p. xiii).  It is a comprehensive 
study and builds upon an earlier Rand Corporation study, Next Steps in Reshaping 
Intelligence by Treverton (2005). This latter study discusses the implications of the 2004 
December bill, which created a Director of National Intelligence and as Treverton (2005) 
asserts is the first step towards reshaping United States intelligence.  He goes on to 
identify five next steps:  (1) building the capacity to manage; (2) shaping intelligence by 
mission or issue, not collection source or agency; (3) improving analysis; (4) taking 
advantage of a very different workforce; and (5) targeting collection (2005, p. vii).  
Although, all are viable steps what the list lacks is a discussion about how those agencies 
charged with domestic intelligence responsibilities may need to think and act differently 
to better face today’s threats.  The Rand Corporation’s studies clearly identify what a 
domestic intelligence agency should do but does not offer how the agency would actually 
conduct domestic intelligence. As well, the Rand studies lack a full discussion and 
presentation of data regarding the pros and cons of separating or combining domestic 
intelligence and law enforcement functions in the United States.   
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In an effort to determine best practices for the United States, this research 
included a comparative study of the national security systems of distinct security 
apparatus’ in two different countries—on one hand, the United Kingdom, which 
maintains separate intelligence and law enforcement functions, and on the other, France, 
which more formally combines these functions. Herman (2001) in his book, Intelligence 
Services in the Information Age, reveals a comprehensive knowledge of various western 
domestic intelligence services, particularly the British MI-5 model.  As a British 
professional for approximately 25 years, he is considered a leading authority on 
intelligence issues.  He provides extensive and detailed information regarding the 
similarities and differences between the British and American systems.  The comparison 
study he (Herman, 2001) conducts in Intelligence Services in the Information Age is 
extremely relevant to the problem and questions at hand.  During his study concerning 
the focus of domestic intelligence, Herman draws upon the experiences of other western 
intelligence services and particularly focuses on the British model (2001, p. 56). Herman 
does not provide an opinion as to how the United States should develop a domestic 
intelligence capability but more importantly characterizes the British Security Service as 
being part FBI and part CIA, seemingly referring to the fact to the service informally 
integrates intelligence and law enforcement functions (2001, p. 131).  Although his 
hybrid characterization serves to remind us that there are no clear cut answers or other 
models that are wholly applicable to United States domestic intelligence, it does seem to 
suggest he favors a combined domestic intelligence and law enforcement approach 
(Herman, 2001).  This suggestion is rather remarkable considering his career was spent 
inside a model that separated domestic intelligence and law enforcement.   
Lastly, this research has revealed a significant lack of discussion regarding the 
feasibility of applying contemporary business principles to any reform of the current 
national security system.  More specifically, reference materials fail to fully explore how 
the national security’s players need to look, think, and act differently given the agility, 
speed, and complexity of twenty-first century threats.  To “jump start” such a discussion, 
this research looked to several reference materials to begin to fill this void and as the 9/11 
Commission recommended—to think outside the box.  Most critical to this discussion are 
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the principles found in Brafman and Beckstrom’s The Starfish and the Spider, The 
Unstoppable Power of Leaderless Organizations (2007), Pink’s, A Whole New Mind, 
Why Right-Brainers Will Rule the Future (2006), Kim and Mauborgne’s, Blue Ocean 
Strategy, How to Create Uncontested Market Space and Make the Competition Irrelevant 
(2005), and Gerencser, Lee, Napolitano, Kelly, Megacommunities, How Leaders of 
Government, Business and Non-Profits Can Tackle Today’s Global Challenges Together 
(2008).  Each of these reference materials offer unique insights and principles not 
frequently included in present-day discussions involving national security transformation 
for today’s threat environment.   
For example, in Brafman and Beckstrom’s, The Starfish and The Spider (2007), 
the authors discuss different organizational characteristics and hypothesize that 
leaderless, decentralized organizations are more adaptive and resilient than those that are 
centralized and have overt, command and control structures. The authors characterize the 
first type of organization as starfish organizations and the latter as spider organizations 
(pp. 34–46). Although the authors do not specifically discuss the application of these 
principles in regards to national security reform, they do go to the extent to describe how 
Al Qaeda as a leaderless, networked organization is better addressed by the same (p. 55). 
So whether by thoughtful intent or happenstance, Al Qaeda changed from what Brafman 
and Beckstrom would describe as a spider organization to a starfish organization.  This 
evolution presents new dangers for the United States and presents lessons for the national 
security system.   
In Kim and Mauborgne’s (2005), Blue Ocean Strategy, the authors discuss two 
views of strategy: structuralist view and reconstructionist view. The structuralist view is 
based upon a competition based structure-conduct-performance model (p. 17). According 
to Kim and Mauborgne, this view is driven by what they refer to as a red ocean strategy 
wherein industry boundaries are defined and accepted and the competitive rules of the 
game are known. In contrast, the reconstructionist view is driven by what they refer to as 
a blue ocean strategy which focuses on the demand side of the market. This view 
recognizes the market as being more significantly changed by the creation of new  
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“outside the box” ideas, which in turn increase both opportunity and demand (Kim and 
Mauborgne, 2005. pp. 17–18). This research explored whether some of the answers to 
security reform lie within blue ocean strategies. 
Daniel Pink, in A Whole New Mind (2005), argues, “the keys to the kingdom are 
changing hands and right brain thinkers are needed for the future (p. 1).  In his book, Pink 
distinguishes between the left brain mode of thinking, which reasons sequentially, excels 
at analysis, and handles words and the right brain mode of thinking which reasons 
holistically, recognizes patterns, and interprets emotions and nonverbal (p.14). The 
changing of the keys, as he refers to, is a result of material abundance and globalization 
that is shipping white-collar employment overseas, and technology that is eliminating 
certain type of work all together (Pink, 2005, p. 2). As a result, he argues what is needed 
now and in the future is an ability to express through storytelling, empathy, creativity, 
and innovation—all right brain versus left brain attributes (pp. 65–67). One of the critical 
findings of the 9/11 Commission (2004), that the current national security system lacked 
imagination supports, Pink’s claim.  Arguably, today’s heavily centralized national 
security system is comprised of multiple spider organizations that ensure structure, 
organization, command and control within each agency—NOT imaginative and creative 
problem solving within and between agencies—as Pink would argue, right brain 
attributes.   
Gerencser et al. note in their book Megacommunities (2008) that “individuals and 
organizations come to megacommunities when they recognize that the problems facing 
them are more complex than they can solve alone” (p. 54).  The problem and questions 
addressed by this research are some of the more challenging and complex problems 
facing today’s national security leaders and the United States government as a whole.  In 
order to effectively address this problem, it must be recognized that it cannot be solved 
by a single agency or individual alone but rather must be addressed by the collective 
national security system—a community.  Considering that the national security system is 




enforcement jurisdictions, (Sims & Gerber, 2005, p. 207) which must rely on each other 
and work together to fully protect the United States, inherently, it has the appearance of a 
“megacommunity” as defined in Megacommunities.    
In summary, the literature review highlighted gaps (Lowenthall, 2006, p. 32) by 
identifying what is meant by domestic intelligence as compared to domestic security and 
homeland security.  Throughout the literature, there is a clear call for an enhanced 
domestic intelligence capability, but the discussion lacks clear guidance on not only what 
this means but how it is achieved.  Arguably, the literature lacks a discussion about 
whether it is best for the United States to separate or combine domestic intelligence with 
a law enforcement function.  The primary objective of this thesis was to add to the 
discourse relating to how the United States structures its domestic intelligence and law 
enforcement capabilities and fully explores the applicability of business principles to any 
national security reform.  Ultimately, this thesis sought to assist in ending the ongoing 
debate by answering the question surrounding domestic intelligence.  And lastly, this 
thesis sought to push the boundaries by proposing dramatic change within the security 
system.  The change needed within the system goes well beyond determining whether the 
United States needs to separate or combine domestic intelligence and law enforcement.  
For if the system and its parts do not look, think, and act differently, the United States 
will likely chase threats versus anticipating and proactively dismantling them.  These 
threats are far too complex for any one agency to handle, and so it is through behaving as 
a megacommunity that the full strength of the system can be brought to bear against these 
threats.  Moreover, a more networked system is arguably better postured to address a 
networked threat, such as Al Qaeda.   
As profit-based organizations strive to stay relevant to maximize their results, so 
too should the national security system.  The government’s leaders and reformers must 
seek relevancy by redefining national security to better understand and anticipate today’s 
threats and build a preventative national security system.  The new national security 




Additionally, the security system must develop and maintain a unified and agile response 
to these threats or it will likely linger behind.  In the private sector, they call it 
bankruptcy.   
D. METHODOLOGY  
1. Interviews 
Interviews were conducted to collect qualitative data relevant to the question this 
research addresses.  The four interviewees for this research were selected as they 
represent a broad range of national and homeland security perspectives including 
academia, think tanks, federal law enforcement, and counterterrorism strategic analysis.  
The respondents provided objective and relevant opinions, perspectives, and solutions 
concerning broad government reorganization, practical law enforcement, and domestic 
intelligence challenges associated with the current and foreseeable threat environment, 
and vulnerabilities and gaps between the federal and local homeland security landscape.  
Through a series of questions listed in Chapter V, these individuals expanded the current 
dialogue regarding national security, specifically whether domestic intelligence needs 
separated from law enforcement or combined with law enforcement to best posture the 
U.S. to address twenty-first century national security challenges.   
2. Comparative Study  
In an effort to determine best practices for the U.S., it is instructive to 
comparatively study the national security systems of distinct security apparatus, in two 
different countries—on one hand, the United Kingdom, which maintains separate 
intelligence and law enforcement functions and on the other, France, which more 
formally combines these functions.  This study will focus particularly on how these 
countries address and integrate domestic intelligence and law enforcement functions at 
the national level. 
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II. UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM 
A. YESTERDAY’S NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM 
For lack of guidance a nation falls, but many advisers make victory sure. 
(Brown, 2008) 
Emerging from the rubbles of World War II and the experiences of the Cold War, 
the current national security apparatus remained virtually unchanged until the events of 
9/11; but why?  Arguably, the system failed—it failed to fully recognize that external 
national threats had somehow and at some point become internal domestic threats.  The 
enemy that was expected to attack the United States from afar attacked it from within.  
But looking back certainly helps explain why this happened…until 2001, the United 
States seemed secured by its borders as international travel was more costly, external 
events provided limited impact to the homeland, and there was confidence in the 
knowledge and understanding of the country’s enemies.  National security had always 
meant defense of the United States from external threats. Domestic threats had not yet 
risen to a national level.  The enemy was seen as outside the United States and was 
expected to stay there.  As a result, the primary national security players were the 
departments of military and state, not the intelligence community (IC).   
It was not until 1947 that the IC received a legal basis through the enactment of 
the National Security Act of 1947. The importance of the act was that it not only denoted 
the importance of intelligence, but that it created the national security system’s core 
(Lowenthal, 2006, p. 20).  At this core sat the President, the departments, mainly the 
State Department and the Department of Defense, but at times also included the 
Departments of Justice, Treasury, and Agriculture, the National Security Council (NSC), 
the IC, and Congress (Lowenthal, 2006, p. 175).  The job of unifying this system rested 
with the National Security Council (NSC), which was created on the heels of the National 
Security Act.   
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Charged with the function of advising the President with respect to the integration 
of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable 
the military services and the other departments and agencies of the government to 
cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security, the NSC has 
become one of the cornerstones of the nation’s security (Brown, 2008, p. 19).  Although 
each President has put his own stamp onto the council, since its inception, this entity has 
grown into a network of interagency groups involved in integrating national security 
policy development, oversight of implementation, and crisis management (Brown, 2008, 
p. 81).  The council led the system during the Korean War, through the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, Vietnam War, the Iran-Contra Affair, fall of the Berlin Wall, and finally the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.   
But in the post-Cold War environment, the priorities of the national security 
system shifted and the need for a robust intelligence capability was questioned.  What 
followed were severe cuts in the national security budgets, including defense spending, 
and civilian intelligence personnel.  As the Soviet Union was no longer a threat the 
“enemy that had previously unified the system toward a common cause was gone.  Many 
questioned:  Now what?” (Brown, 2008, pp. 65, 81).  
It did not take long for the new enemy to present itself in the form of a small band 
of terrorists led by Ramzi Yousef, nephew of 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed.  In 1993, Islamic radicals struck the World Trade Center, successfully 
attacking the homeland for the first time (Global Security, n.d. (b)). Few recognized the 
significance as this attack did not spark a dramatic change within the national security 
system.  Business continued as usual, information sharing remained stove-piped, and 
agency interests continued in a competitive versus unified mode.  Fatwas issued from 
Osama Bin Laden, relatively unknown at the time, began in 1996 and called for “jihad” 
against the Western occupation of Islamic lands (PBS Online NewsHour, 1996).  
Al Qaeda’s fatwas welcomed in the millennium and brought an unprecedented 
level of violence to the United States at home and abroad.  A list of attacks attributed to 
terrorist organizations since the early 1990s seemed to clearly forecast what was to come 
on September 11, 2001, and yet the system did not fully acknowledge the signs.  On 
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February 23, 1998, Bin Laden issued his second fatwa which declared it the incumbent 
duty of every Muslim to kill Americans and their allies—both civilians and military (PBS 
Online NewsHour, 1998).  On the heels of this alarming fatwa, Al Qaeda demonstrated 
its sophistication by executing simultaneous attacks of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, 
Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.  Al Qaeda plots continued into the new decade with 
the attack on the USS Cole in the port of Yemen in October 2000 (FBI, n.d. (a)).  
Although the targets were clearly attributable to the United States government, 
they demonstrated that Islamic terrorism directed against the United States had arrived, 
and it was not going away anytime soon.  But this was a very different type of threat for 
the national security system to address.  There was no seat of government, no ground 
rules.  Not only was there no head of state to negotiate with, but negotiations were for 
perhaps the first time, not appropriate.  It should be no surprise that the national security 
system did not perform optimally—for it was not equipped to do so.  The 1947 national 
security system had not undergone any significant reform since its inception; yet, the 
national threat had changed significantly (Project on National Security Reform & Center 
for Study of the Presidency, 2008, pp. v–x). Exploring what caused the national threats to 
change is a worthy endeavor as this exercise presents valuable options to reform the 
current system from one that is antiquated, stove piped, and redundant to one that is agile, 
unified, and interconnected.   
B. THE NEW WORLD ORDER—GLOBALIZATION CREATES AN 
UNPRECEDENTED INTERCONNECTED WORLD 
Speaking to the Council on Foreign Relations on February 23, 2009, FBI Director 
Robert S. Mueller III assessed the United States threat environment in the world today as 
markedly changed, “from the integration of global markets and the ease of international 
travel to the rise and the reach of the Internet” (Council on Foreign Relations, 2009, p. 1).  
In 2008, Director Mueller acknowledged that as threats change every 18 months, and the 
FBI needs to identify and adapt to ever-changing national security threats (Frieden, 2008, 
p. 1).  In its final report, the 9/11 Commission noted that threats are defined, “more by 
fault lines within societies than by the territorial boundaries between them.  From 
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terrorism to global disease or environmental degradation, the challenges have become 
transnational rather than international” (2004, pp. 361–362).  
In fact, the divide between domestic, international and transnational twenty-first 
century threats is decreasing at an alarming rate.  In the MIPT Terrorism Annual 2002, 
David Brannan’s article, “Beyond International Terrorism: Thinking About the 
‘Domestic’ Versus ‘International’ Divide,” suggested that globalization has contributed 
significantly to the difficulty of adequately responding to the threat posed by terrorists 
(2002).  In fact, it is argued, “globalization is eroding the ability of states to control illicit 
activity within their borders” (Brannan, 2002, p. 4). In the post-9/11 environment, 
although terrorism remains a prominent national security threat, a recent Washington Post 
article, “Kidnapped by the Cartels,” highlighted the effect of globalization on other 
threats to the nation’s security, namely violence associated with narcotics trafficking 
(Will, 2009).  As Police Chief Jack Harris of the Phoenix Police Department noted, “The 
cross-border traffic in narcotics and people is just one way globalization is shaping 
crime” (2009). The volatility at the borders created by the drug trafficking trade—the 
increase in the number of kidnappings and ransom demands, murder, and general 
lawlessness—creates vulnerabilities which can be exploited by others, namely terrorist 
groups.   
As a result of globalization, criminal activities that were once separate are 
interconnected in ways not previously experienced.  In today’s world, information flow is 
as fast as spoken words.  Virtual networks spring to life and connect groups that would 
otherwise never meet.  Events instantaneously move across communication wires, with 
immediate impact.  Technology is feeding globalization, which in turn, pushes the 
national threat to change much more frequently, resulting in a phenomenon some have 
referred to as “blue water to brown water.” (Kiernan, 2009).  To counter globalized 
threats the national security system must be as connected, interdependent, and networked.  
One weak link in the system now weakens the entire system much like a cascading fault 




towards answering how to reform the national security system.  The second step is 
looking at the current system and through developing an understanding of how it got 
where it is, identify what is missing and thus needed.   
C. TODAY’S NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM IN THE POST-9/11 
ENVIRONMENT 
The challenges of the 21st century are increasingly unconventional and 
transnational, and therefore demand a response that effectively integrates 
all aspects of American power.    
(President Obama, 2009) 
Evidenced by the fact that threats now traverse from blue ocean waters to brown 
river waters, thereby blurring the line between international and domestic threats as 
depicted below in Figure 1, there is a great necessity for a transformation within the 
national security system.  The development and use of new terms and definitions to 
ensure the system remains relevant to today’s threat realities is critical.  As National 
Security Adviser General James L. Jones stated, “The idea that somehow 
counterterrorism is a homeland security issue doesn’t make sense when you recognize the 
fact that terror around the world doesn't recognize border” (AlterNet, 2009). As a result, 
“there is no right-hand, left-hand anymore” (AlterNet, 2009, p. 3). These statements 
support the conclusion that General Jones believes the divide that once existed between 
homeland threats and national security threats has dissipated.   
Interestingly, months before the 9/11 attacks, the Bush Administration issued its 
first National Security Presidential Directive and defined national security for what is 
believed to be the first time within a presidential directive. Within NSPD-1 national 
security was defined as: “the defense of the United States of America, protection of our 
constitutional system of government, and the advancement of United States interests 
around the globe” (Brown, 2008, p. 71).  Because this definition was used within the 
directive after Islamic extremists had already attacked United States soil, a military vessel 
and several overseas military installations, it is somewhat surprising that the definition 
lacked definitive language that would address how the United States should conduct 
reactive and proactive domestic intelligence activities.     
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Within months of the 9/11 attacks, the Bush Administration took several more 
dramatic actions that significantly altered the security system for the first time since its 
inception.  The first change occurred as a result of the Bush Administration’s creation of 
the Department of Homeland Security, which merged 22 different organizations.  The 
reasoning behind the merger of these various agencies assumed a difference between 
homeland security and national security—arguably flawed logic. The second change 
came in June 2002 with the creation of the Homeland Security Council (HSC), designed 
to mirror the National Security Council and develop policies and integrate United States 
homeland security institutions and security related activities (Stockton, 2009, p. 4). 
Additionally, if there is no longer a difference between national security and homeland 
security, then the fact that after the merger, DHS did not encompass most of the national 
security players became another noticeable flaw.  So from the start, the mission of DHS 
to integrate homeland security institutions and security related activities was a significant 
challenge.   
As a follow up act, in 2004 Congress engaged in national security reform by 
enacting the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) (Brown, 2008, 
p. 79).  This act created the Director for National Intelligence who serves as the 
President’s principal adviser on intelligence matters.  In essence, this new position 
displaced the role of the Director for Central Intelligence, who had held this 
responsibility since 1947.  In reality, this act created just one more actor in the nation’s 
security landscape.  An actor, much like the HSC and DHS, all of whom were handed 
thin playbooks which lacked authority and detailed guidance as to how to implement its 
newly defined missions, goals, and objectives.   
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“Blue water to brown water,” Dr. Kathleen Kiernan
 
Figure 1.   Law Enforcement /War Approach 
It is clear in hindsight that post-9/11 that the policies of the U.S. government 
rightly or wrongly shifted quickly to address the fear of failing in order to prevent the 
next attack and, more specifically, the “ticking time bomb scenario,” a scenario which to 
date has not been seen played out except on television and in movies. Decisions made in 
the post-9/11 environment to engage in unusual extraditions, renditions and enhanced 
interrogation techniques, the use of enemy combatant designations, and long-term 
detainments without judicial process, set the United States down a path with grave 
consequences.  These decisions made in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks when the 
United States was continuing efforts to identify the almost 3,000 individuals killed, when 
public emotion was raw, when an “at all costs” approach to securing the nation and its 
people prevailed, arguably set the nation on an ill advised course. As Bongar, Beutler, 
Zimbardo, and Brown (2004) suggest in Psychology of Terrorism that the United States 
government clearly adopted a war versus justice approach, which from the start ruled out 
the ability to use all aspects of the American power (2004, pp. 56–64). 
As much as the Bush Administration will be marked by the 9/11 attacks, the 
Obama Administration is likely to be marked by some form of post-9/11 reform.  One of 
the first signs of such reforms came from Attorney General nominee Eric Holder in 
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January 2009 during his Senate Confirmation Hearings when he stated that one of the 
enhanced techniques, water boarding, is torture and further ordered a review of the CIA’s 
Interrogation Program by a Special Prosecutor (Democracy Now, 2009, p. 2).  These 
comments were solidified a few days later when newly elected President Obama revoked 
Executive Order 13440, which had allowed for the use of enhanced interrogation 
techniques (White House, 2009). Further change was forecasted by Senator Collins 
during the June 2008 Senate Committee on Armed Services hearings to discuss the 
origins of aggressive interrogation techniques. As the Senator noted, the FBI probably 
has the most extensive experience in the U.S. government with interviewing hostile 
detainees, yet it remained uninvolved post-9/11 (U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed 
Services, 2008, p. 28). Instead, the Director of Central Intelligence assigned 
responsibility for implementing capture and detention authority to certain designated 
groups within the CIA.   
To some degree, there was a belief that interviews and interrogations could not 
effectively be accomplished by traditional law enforcement interviewing methods—a 
criminal justice approach. The introduction and use of enhanced techniques was seen as a 
necessity when dealing with the high value detainees, like Khalid Shaikh Mohammad, 
deemed the mastermind of the September 11, 2001, attacks, and Abu Zubaydah, who was 
captured in March 2002 and believed at that time to have critical intelligence necessary to 
prevent another attack (Global Security, n.d.(a)).   
A major post-9/11 reform is the adoption of a justice versus war approach to 
terrorism.  Immediately upon taking office, President Obama dropped the term, “war on 
terrorism” and adopted a justice approach to terrorism.  This approach has played out as 
the new administration quickly enlisted the assistance of a number of task forces to 
consider the difficult issues in dealing with the capture, detention, transfer, interview and 
interrogation of terrorists, including the closure of Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp. As 
reported by Peter Finn’s article, “Specialized Interrogation Unit May Be Created” in the 




reviewing U.S. interrogation policy in order to recommend new interrogation guidelines, 
including an assessment of whether the interrogation guidance provided in the Army 
Field Manual is sufficient.  
On August 24, 2009, the Washington Post reported that President Obama had 
approved the creation of an elite, inter-agency team of interrogators made up of 
intelligence, military and law enforcement agency personnel, to interview and interrogate 
high value detainees and will be called the High Value Detainee Interrogation Group 
(HIG) (Kornblut, 2009). According to the article, this team will be housed in the FBI, but 
subject to oversight by the National Security Council (NSC), effectively moving away 
from the CIA’s focus of control over this program (Kornblut, 2009). Reportedly, the 
limitations on what techniques can be employed during interrogations will be that which 
is contained in the Army Field Manual (TRADOC, 2006). According to the article, the 
task force determined unanimously that “the Army Field Manual provides appropriate 
guidance on interrogation for military interrogators and that no additional or different 
guidance was necessary for other agencies” (Kornblut, 2009). The FBI and other law 
enforcement entities are already limited by the Constitution, federal statutes, and policies 
regarding interviews and interrogations (Kornblut, 2009). 
Another major post-9/11 reform came in May 2009 with the merger of the HSC 
into the NSC.  This merger is seen as quickening and unifying security policymaking 
inside the White House (Hsu, 2009).  Equally important, it signals an understanding that 
homeland security issues and national security issues are interrelated and blurred to the 
point of needing one council to advise the President.  This is arguably one of the most 
significant steps towards security reform to address twenty-first century threats.  Inherent 
in this merger is a new definition of national security, one that encompasses threats 
against U.S. soil.  National security no longer means defense of the United States against 
external enemies, but enemies inside the nation’s borders as well.    
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III. HOW AND WHY THE NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM 
NEEDS TO LOOK, THINK, AND ACT DIFFERENTLY 
The illiterate of the 21st century will not be those who cannot read and 
write, but those who cannot learn, unlearn and relearn.  
(Alvin Toffler) 
Immediately following the 9/11 attacks, the “experts” confidently and without 
hesitation asked one question—what did the national security system need to look like to 
prevent another such attack, more specifically, whether or not the United States needed to 
create a new domestic intelligence agency.  But even if this question was finally and 
correctly answered, is this enough to keep the nation safe?  As the 9/11 Commission 
noted the “biggest impediment to a greater likelihood of connecting the dots is the human 
and systematic resistance to sharing information” (2004, p. 416). Given the complexity, 
speed, agility, and adaptability of twenty-first century threats, the answer, more than 
likely, is no.  As U.S. enemies evolve into distributed and resilient networks, the United 
States security system should reform well beyond just looking different.  Hence, in 
answering the  questions—how the national security system and its parts need to think 
and act differently given the new challenges faced—this research pursued identifying 
reform possibilities well beyond the system looking different.    
In the Art of War, Sun-tzu discussed, “the critical element of a clearly defined 
organization in control of thoroughly disciplined and well ordered troops is spirit, or 
better characterized as Ch’i.” (1996, p. 23). According to Sun tzu, it is a vital Ch’i that 
propels all people to their maximum capabilities and without a nurtured spirit, the will to 
do more slips away. Arguably, the current national security system lacks a vital Ch’i, one 
which makes the system’s players more unified, seamless and collaborative.   
Suggested herein is that there is a need for the national security system and its 
parts to go outside of the system itself in order to answer the questions of how to look, 
think, and act differently in this new world order.  Places like the business arena offer 
valuable clues.  Arguably, principles, strategies, and mindsets designed to return high  
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profits, long-term gains, stability, creativity, and innovation that chases open market 
space are ideas that should be considered by those participating in any aspect of national 
security reform.  
In the previous chapters, the discussion has centered on whether the United States 
should separate or combine its domestic intelligence and law enforcement functions.  
Although this goes towards answering how the system should look given the complexity, 
interconnectivity, and impact of twenty-first century threats, this discussion falls short of 
exploring all ways the system can look differently.  For example, Gerencser et al. in 
Megacommunities discuss the traits of issues/problems that will or should produce 
megacommunities: interconnectedness, impact, and ability to escalate. As such, 
megacommunities are seen by these authors as necessary to effectively address problems 
that are interconnected and interdependent, have impact across sectors, and escalate at a 
rate difficult to match let alone outpace (2008, p. 30). The authors argue that because of 
globalization and fast paced technology, many of today’s problems are so complex they 
cannot be addressed effectively by single organizations but must be addressed by a 
community of organizations—a megacommunity, whose leaders and members have 
deliberately come together across national, organizational, and sectoral boundaries to 
address such complex and wicked problems (Gerencser, 2008, p. 28). 
Considering that the national security system is comprised of 16 intelligence 
agencies and 87,000 law enforcement jurisdictions, which must rely on each other and 
work together to fully protect the U.S., inherently, it has the appearance of a 
“megacommunity” as defined by Gerencser et al. (2008).  The problem however, is that it 
does not deliberately function as one.  It is important to understand that a 
megacommunity is not organically created but must be affirmatively created by the 
affected group of organizations within the particular community facing the problems.  In 
a functioning megacommunity, each community member offers a particular role and 
purpose, which is understood and accepted by the community as a whole.  It is in this 
way the community becomes unified.  Different entities begin working together and 
sharing responsibility for achieving the objectives of the megacommunity. But, the 
authors note that a megacommunity must have not only recognition but a leadership 
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approach which has neither a centralized decision-making entity nor a single leader.  
Everyone within the community must have some influence.  Under this construct, the 
megacommunity thrives on alignment and optimization (Gerencser et al., 2008, pp. 57, 
75).  
Looking at how the U.S. ensures maximum leveraging of its domestic law 
enforcement and intelligence capabilities to guarantee quick translation of covert 
intelligence into action, the megacommunity approach is essential given today’s 
interconnected world.  For instance, as a result of globalization, criminal activities 
interconnect in ways not previously experienced.  Information flow is as fast as spoken 
words and virtual networks spring to life and connect individuals and groups whose paths 
would otherwise never cross.  Technology has fed globalization pushing the national 
threat to change much more frequently.  Given this unprecedented, complex, and time-
sensitive problem, it becomes evident the threat cannot effectively be addressed by any 
single agency within the existing national security structure.  As a result, change is not 
only needed but needed immediately.    
Whether the United States chooses to separate intelligence from law enforcement 
functions by creating a new domestic intelligence agency or combining these functions in 
a National Security Organization, either entity can and should become part of a national 
security megacommunity.  But to do so, this national security player will need to think 
and act differently as a means of becoming a part of the megacommunity.   
It is essential that either the new domestic intelligence agency or a National 
Security Organization achieve this change if it is to successfully become part of a 
megacommunity.  As Gercenser et al. argue megacommunities are as much or more 
about thinking and acting different as they are about looking different. (2008, p. 80).  The 
requirement of national security players, including a possible new player, to think and act 
different is arguably the more difficult objective to achieve, as this endeavor demands 
these players to disentangle from some deeply held entrenched and ingrained habits of 
thoughts (p. 82).  Not an easy feat by any means.   
 32
On its face, a discussion by the national security community about how to achieve 
these objectives would meet the definition of Kim and Mauborgne’s definition of a blue 
ocean strategy (2005).  These authors would see this strategy is one that is not confined 
by existing rules but rather one that is looking for new opportunities and ideas—a blue 
ocean strategy.  In contrast, the authors would note that the opposite strategy would be a 
red ocean strategy that looks to maintain status quo based upon existing rules and 
expectations (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005).  Today, these authors would more than likely 
argue that the national security system operates using red ocean strategies as it has 
predominantly remained unchanged, thus confining itself to competing within an existing 
set of rules (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005, pp. 4–5). Within their book, the authors would 
propose that the framers of national security reform, as an alternative, should attempt to 
go beyond creating a “better” situation, and instead create a whole new conceptual 
interpretation of what national security is in the twenty-first century based upon how its 
greatest threats look, think and act.  
In continuing to look for new ideas applicable to national security reform, this 
research relied upon the ideas found in Brafman and Beckstrom’s, The Starfish and the 
Spider (2007). Within their book, the authors compare starfish to spiders.  Starfish, 
described as adaptive, flexible and resilient by nature, have the ability to mutate and 
produce new growth.  Spiders, on the other hand, are centralized with a well-defined head 
and will not produce new or adaptive growth when injured, and as a result, tend to die. 
The authors argue that the success of an organization in today’s environment, in large 
part, depends upon how well it adopts starfish characteristics which include the following 
principles: (1) when attacked, a decentralized organization tends to become even more 
open and decentralized; (2) it is easy to mistake starfish for spiders; (3) an open system 
does not have centralized intelligence as the intelligence is spread throughout the system; 
(4) open systems can easily mutate; (5) the decentralized organization is transparent; and 
(6) as industries become decentralized, overall profits decrease (Brafman & Beckstrom, 
2006, pp. 35–45).  Additionally, Brafman and Beckstrom argue that the value of the 
starfish approach is found in its ability to nurture, promote, and encourage networking 
across segments, which spread power and intelligence throughout the system. Centralized 
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organizations (spider characteristics), on the other hand, are top down systems that 
develop, maintain, and promote power at the top only. Power at the top not only slows 
down decision making but discourages the development of new ideas and vested interests 
in employees (Brafman & Beckstrom, 2006, pp. 46–50). Well, clearly the current 
national security system is more aligned to Brafman and Beckstrom’s spider 
characteristics.  But should this status quo continue or change?       
The strategy and management consulting firm Toffler Associates have seemingly 
incorporated these principles in their corporate strategies demonstrated by the company’s 
literature (n.d.).  For example, Figure 2 depicts the following attributes recognized by 
Toffler Associates as being critical for successful organizational reform to stay relevant 
to the new world order:  
1. Align which the recognition that today’s organization needs to look, think 
and act differently to remain relevant in the twenty-first century;  
2. Strategic ambition or value is the psychological, emotional and rational 
roadmap for navigation into the future;  
3. Strategy enables synchronized and coordinated action to realize the vision 
or aspiration;  
4. Alignment is a shared sense among all team members of how to work 
together to achieve the strategy;  
5. Execution refers to the successful implementation and outputs of the 
strategy;  
6. Resilience is the long-term ability to maintain a constancy of purpose and 
to pursue goals successfully even when encountering a changing 
environment; and  
7. Renewal is the timely pursuit of a new vision and strategy (Toffler 
Associates, n.d. (b)).      
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Figure 2.   Toffler Associates Diagram  
In summary, the clear signals expressed by Toffler Associates, Kim and 
Mauborgne’s Blue Ocean Strategy, Gerencser et al.’s Megacommunities, Brafman and 
Beckstrom’s Starfish, and Pink’s A Whole New Mind are that any organization in today’s 
new world undergoing major reform must break out of former molds and incorporate 
innovation, adaptability, and resilience.  In other words, if any organization is to become 
and remain relevant in the twenty-first century they must look, think and act differently.   
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IV. COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE SECURITY MODELS OF 
THE UNITED KINGDOM AND FRANCE 
In order to effectively address the twenty-first century threats to U.S. national 
security, the crucial question is whether the U.S. domestic intelligence and law 
enforcement functions should be separated between agencies or combined within one 
agency.  Currently, the U.S. combines domestic law enforcement and intelligence 
functions in the FBI.  However, the ongoing discussion since 9/11 revolves around 
whether the U.S. should create a separate domestic intelligence agency with no law 
enforcement capability.  Although there is little disagreement as to the value of 
seamlessly integrating intelligence and law enforcement functions, there is dramatic 
disagreement as to how the U.S. ensures this seamless integration—whether to enhance 
the current model which already combines these functions or separate them by creating a 
new domestic intelligence agency.  
This chapter provides the results of a comparative study that compares and 
contrasts the approaches utilized in the United Kingdom, which separates domestic 
intelligence and law enforcement functions in different agencies, and France, which 
combines the two.  The goal is to highlight the need for clarity regarding how the national 
security system of the United States should best be organized when considering these two 
very different approaches.   
As Brian Jackson shares from one of his Rand Corporation studies, the struggle to 
define the proper relationship between law enforcement and intelligence has emerged as a 
common factor among the domestic intelligence experiences of our allied security 
services (2009, p. 157).  Although each country utilizes a different approach, both the 
United Kingdom and the France models have proven successful in their respective threat 
environments.  In determining the best approach for the United States, the complexity of 
the United States’ national security system and the geographic size and scope of the 
United States cannot be ignored.  The joining of knowledge and action in the United 
States environment becomes even more challenging.   
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Although this study will identify the overall structure of the national security 
systems of these countries, it will focus on which particular agencies within these 
countries conduct domestic intelligence and law enforcement functions.  Additionally, it 
will identify the extent to which these two functions are integrated or separated and the 
pros and cons of each.  The goal of this study is to assist in determining on a conceptual 
and operational level which approach is most effective for the U.S. in dealing with the 
twenty-first century threats, whether either approach can be effectively applied in the 
U.S. and which approach is most effective when applied to the U.S.  
According to Masse in his report for Congress, Domestic Intelligence in the 
United Kingdom: Applicability of the MI-5 Model to the United States, “integration of 
domestic intelligence and law enforcement functions may improve coordination of these 
two functions, but may also undermine the focus and development of skill specialization 
necessary to succeed in each area” (2003). Clarity regarding how the U.S. national 
security system should best be organized is sought by assessing these two very different 
approaches.  
A. HOW THE SECURITY MODELS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND 
FRANCE ARE STRUCTURED ORGANIZATIONALLY, INTEGRATE 
INTELLIGENCE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT FUNCTIONS, AND PROS 
AND CONS OF EACH MODEL 
1. United Kingdom: Separated Domestic Intelligence and Law 
Enforcement System   
The security system of the United Kingdom consists of primarily four 
organizations: the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), also known as MI-6; the Government 
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)’ the British Security Service (BSS), also known 
as MI-5; and the Defense Intelligence Staff (DIS). The SIS is a separate foreign 
intelligence agency with an outward focus on the production of secret intelligence on 
issues concerning the UK’s interests regarding security, defense, and foreign and 
economic policies.  The GCHQ is a single point of collection for the production of 
signals intelligence.  The DIS analyzes defense related intelligence for the Ministry of 
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Defense and the Armed Forces.  The BSS is a domestic intelligence agency charged with 
gathering, analyzing, accessing, advising, and acting on security intelligence.   
This comparative study specifically focuses on the relationship between the BSS 
and the Metropolitan Police Service, in conjunction with the other UK police forces, in 
determining how these agencies integrate and coordinate intelligence and law 
enforcement functions to address globally driven and changing national security threats.  
Though the predecessor of BSS was created in the time period leading up to World War 
1, the Security Service through the years has shifted its jurisdiction to address changing 
national security threats (Masse, 2003, p. 5).  Today, the purpose of the Security Service 
is to “protect national security and economic well being, and to support law enforcement 
agencies in preventing and detecting serious crime” (Office of Public Sector Information, 
n.d.).   
The most important feature of the UK security system is that organizationally, the 
UK separates its domestic intelligence function executed primarily by BSS from its law 
enforcement function executed by the Metropolitan Police Service and the other UK 
police agencies.  Hence, the BSS is the UK’s domestic security intelligence agency 
responsible for protecting the nation against national security threats, yet it lacks 
functional law enforcement powers.  Thus, BSS must rely on one of its more crucial 
partners for law enforcement powers—the local police (Treverton, 2008a, p. 63).   
To facilitate critical integration of domestic intelligence and law enforcement 
functions, the UK system employs several key processes and structures meant to ensure 
information sharing and timely law enforce action.  The UK system leverages the Special 
Branches, including the Metropolitan Police Counter Terrorism Command, the Executive 
Liaison Group (ELG), the Crown Prosecution Service, and BSS regional offices, 
integrating intelligence and law enforcement functions.   
The Special Branch within the Metropolitan Police Service and the other 56 UK 
police forces gather intelligence in support of BSS national security investigations 
(Metropolitan Police Service, 2004,). Comprised of specially designated local law 
enforcement officers, Special Branches in concert with the BSS, merge intelligence and 
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investigative operations, creating both a proactive and reactive response to national 
security matters.  The Special Branches address the potential gap between domestic 
intelligence and law enforcement within the UK national security system.  By developing 
local and regional community awareness, the BSS and Special Branches combine, 
leverage, share, and exploit local and federal levels of expertise and information 
(Metropolitan Police Service, 2004, pp. 2, 7).  By physically locating the Special Branch 
officers in the arena which made them an important component to national security in the 
first place—their local commands, this model ensures the officers are situated where they 
can best provide BSS law enforcement tools and capability.  Additionally, this model 
puts BSS at the hub of the UK homeland information sharing enterprise by giving Special 
Branch officers a channel to feed locally generated threat intelligence to BSS and, in turn, 
BSS uses these same officers to push threat indicators to their local commands.   
In completing the United Kingdom (UK) homeland information-sharing network, 
BSS informs the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and GCHQ.  In essence through this 
model, Special Branch officers serve as critical nodes between UK domestic intelligence 
and law enforcement functions.  And though they are not technically part of BSS, they 
serve as excellent connectors to the overall UK national security system.   
In 2006, Eliza Manningham-Buller, then Director General of British Security 
Service, declared the service was facing a threat from 1600 identified individuals 
associated with approximately 200 groups that were actively engaged in terrorist plots 
against the UK (Times Online, 2006).  She went on to acknowledge the key partners of 
her service are the police, who work alongside BSS to collect intelligence and convert it 
into evidence for court, highlighting the significant role of Special Branches in the UK 
domestic security system (Times Online, 2006)   
The London-based Metropolitan Police Service and its newly created Counter-
Terrorism Command (CTC) (which merged the former Metropolitan Police Service’s 
own Anti-Terrorism Branch, SO-13 with the Metropolitan Police Service Special Branch, 
SO-12, a special unit designated to work with BSS on national counterterrorism 
investigations) coordinates the national police counterterrorism response (Wilkinson, 
2007, p. 203).  The merger of SO-12 and SO-13 to create the CTC was completed after 
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the 2005 subway bombings as a way to create a multi-faceted, single response to 
domestic terrorism.  Primarily, CTC, as a London-based Special Branch, is responsible 
for working with the Crown Prosecution Service to bring to justice those engaged in 
terrorism.  As CTC works in conjunction with BSS, this model provides both a proactive 
and reactive response to terrorism.  For example, working together these agencies 
develop patterns or trends to prevent attacks and respond to attacks that occur, build and 
leverage relationships in the communities to encourage open lines of communication, and 
to assess, analyze, and develop intelligence to drive operational activity (Metropolitan 
Police Service, n.d.).   
The Executive Liaison Group (ELG) is part of the UK’s national doctrine for 
inter-agency counterterrorism response.  Created in the 1990s in response to the 
Provisional Irish Republican Army attacks, the ELG is an inter-agency structure 
comprised of intelligence and law enforcement personnel.  On an as needed basis, the 
ELG meet to provide operational command of the strategy for national security 
investigations and ensure appropriate coordination between intelligence and law 
enforcement (evidentiary) interests (Smith, 2009). This structure is a formal mechanism 
to ensure UK intelligence and law enforcement functions are leveraged in a timely and 
coordinated fashion.  
The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), similar to the United States Attorney’s 
Office structure, initiates proceedings against those charged with criminal offenses in 
England and Wales (Crown Prosecution Service, n.d.). During 2009, the CPS has begun 
what is called “a community prosecutor approach” to address emerging threats and issues 
with neighborhood communities.  Under this program, the CPS takes on a problem-
solving role at the local level, as it is believed that involvement in the criminal justice 
system at an earlier stage offers non-court opportunities that have a more positive long-
term effect of reducing community violence.  This program reflects an increased role of 
CPS beyond merely preparing case files and prosecuting defendants in court (Crown 
Prosecution Service, 2009).  CPS along with the local police Special Branches, are now 
engaged much earlier in BSS investigations.   
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Recently, eight regional BSS offices have been established to provide immediate 
support to local Special Branches within each region (Smith, 2009). According to 
Glenmore Trenear-Harvey, a Security Service intelligence analyst with 40 years of 
experience, the purpose of these regional offices is to complement Special Branch on 
ground in an effort to help better operate the whole policing network (BBC, 2005).  An 
open search review however, produced very limited information regarding the progress, 
current number, roles, and purposes of these regional offices.   
A spokesman for the Home Secretary was quoted as saying, “the regional growth 
comes as part of the overall expansion of the Service” (The Scotsman, 2009). Although 
there is limited open source information regarding these regional BSS offices, it appears 
they are, in effect, bringing BSS closer to its crucial police partners.  As these 
relationships become more intertwined through Special Branches, ELGs, the community 
prosecutor approach, and regional BSS offices, the intent of the UK national security 
system is to integrate intelligence and law enforcement functions. Although formally the 
UK system separates these functions, it can be argued these highlighted processes and 
structures are designed to ensure these critical functions are seamless and coordinated 
between agencies so that intelligence is quickly actioned.  
2. France: Combined Domestic Intelligence and Law Enforcement 
System   
Based upon its experience with terrorism since the 1980s, France is an 
accomplished European counter-terrorism practitioner.  The security system of France 
consists primarily of four organizations: the General Directorate for External Security 
(DGSE), Central Directorate of Interior Intelligence (DCRI), Judicial Police (DCPJ), and 
the Investigating Magistrates (Gerecht & Schmitt, 2007). 
The DGSE is the foreign intelligence agency responsible for military intelligence, 
strategic information, electronic intelligence, and counterespionage outside the borders of 
the national territory (FAS Intelligence Resource Program, n.d.(b)). The DCRI, formed as 
a result of a merger of Directorate of Territorial Security, DST, France’s former domestic 
intelligence agency and General Intelligence Directorate, RG, the intelligence agency 
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within the national police, is a domestic intelligence agency responsible for 
counterespionage, counterterrorism threats (Shapiro & Suzan, 2003). Upon its creation, 
DCRI was called, “France’s very own FBI,” a reference to its ability to work intelligence 
and law enforcement concurrently (France 24, 2008).   
The DCPJ, France’s national police force, in conjunction with the DCRI, is 
responsible for France’s internal security.  Previously, DCPJ was seen as the face of 
DST, which acted like most purely intelligence agencies traditionally act—“in the 
shadows” (FAS Intelligence Resource Program, n.d (a).). The merger of DST and RG 
into the DCRI significantly integrated the domestic intelligence efforts of DCRI with the 
national police and made DCRI a much more public agency, much like the UK’s BSS in 
the recent past  (Shapiro & Suzan, 2003).   The last critical component of France’s system 
lies in the investigating magistrates.  Created in 1986, these magistrates oversee and often 
direct investigative efforts of France’s domestic intelligence and law enforcement 
agencies, namely the DCRI and DCPJ.  As a result of these merged and integrated 
relationships, France’s national security system has essentially merged its intelligence 
and law enforcement functions (Gerecht & Schmitt, 2007, pp. 2–3). 
This comparative study focused primarily on the relationship between DCRI, 
DCPJ, and the counterterrorist investigating magistrates to determine how these 
organizations integrate and coordinate their intelligence and law enforcement functions to 
address globally driven and changing national security threats.  As distinguished from the 
UK security system, France utilizes a hybrid domestic intelligence and law enforcement 
approach.  This hybrid approach, created as a result of the July 2008 merger of 
Directorate of Territorial Security (DST) and General Intelligence Directorate (RG) and 
the unique role of investigating magistrates has more formally unified France’s domestic 
intelligence and law enforcement functions.    
Notably, in the French system, these investigating magistrates, who are 
considered a cross between a prosecutor and a judge, play a critical role.  The magistrates 
perform impartial investigations with wide latitude and authorities to determine whether a 
crime worthy of a prosecution has been committed.  If such a determination is made, the 
magistrate turns the investigation over to a prosecutor and a defense attorney for judicial 
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process.  Over time, these magistrates have developed into a specialized band of 
terrorism experts, often times working hand in hand with the domestic security service 
and many times directing their investigative efforts.  These joint intelligence and 
judicial/law enforcement efforts have worked seamlessly because the DCRI formally 
consumed what was previously the unofficial dual intelligence and law enforcement roles 
of DST and RB.  Upon the merger of DST and RG, the French intelligence and law 
enforcement functions were more formally combined into one domestic agency, DCRI, 
which assumed both the intelligence and lost enforcement functions. These uniquely 
blended domestic intelligence and law enforcement efforts working with a centralized 
judicial process led by powerful investigating magistrates allow for a quick, effective, 
and unified intelligence and law enforcement counterterrorism response.  (Shapiro & 
Suzan, 2003).  Thus, one can argue, the French approach demonstrates the necessity of a 
seamless and integrated relationship between domestic intelligence and law enforcement 
functions.    
3. Pros and Cons 
In studying U.S. application, Dr. Treverton from Rand Corporation acknowledges 
that a separated domestic intelligence and law enforcement system allows for the ability 
to develop a culture of prevention, maintain a primacy of intelligence functions, develop 
community liaison more easily, and attract a more diverse recruitment pool (Treverton, 
2008b, p. 86).  In the same study, Dr. Treverton further advises that a combined system 
ensures the ability to quickly translate covert information into actionable law 
enforcement purposes—“a grain to bread” approach, which reduces problems dealing 
with coordination, sharing, and integration (Treverton, 2008b, p. 71).  In another study, 
Treverton notes that access to additional and broad sweeping intelligence and law 
enforcement collection can be used jointly to enhance the overall collection efforts 
(Treverton, 2008a, pp. 70–72).  Although there is no clear-cut answer with regards to the 
relationship between intelligence and law enforcement functions, it is clear the 
relationship must be close and UK and France offer two different approaches to integrate 
these disciplines.   
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The UK model is decentralized and relies upon leveraging shared relationships 
between the BSS and the police via the Special Branches and regional offices to action 
covert, sensitive information, and build resiliency.  The CPS, much like its Department of 
Justice counterpart participates when judicial action is necessary.  Although it should be 
noted, under the new “community prosecutor approach,” the CPS is taking on a more 
proactive role.  The UK model has been tested and proven successful in the relatively 
recent disruption of the planned attack using liquid explosives on planes in 2006.   
France’s model, on the other hand, is not limited by shared relationships, as the 
same body can both gather and act on sensitive information very quickly and efficiently. 
This creates a centralized and decentralized system.  France has had similar success as 
evidenced by the 2005 disruption of an operation directed against antiterrorism 
magistrate Jean Louis-Bruguiere (Jackson, 2009, p. 151).  
In considering these two different models for U.S. application, FBI Director 
Robert S. Mueller’s speech given to the Council on Foreign Relations in February 2009, 
is revealing.  In this speech Director Mueller stated, “We must recognize that events 
outside of our control may impact our national security.  We need to know where the 
threat is moving, and we need to get there first” (Council on Foreign Relations, 2009).  
He continued, “the FBI is not an intelligence service that collects, but does not act, nor 
are we a law enforcement service that acts without knowledge.  Today’s FBI is a security 
service, fusing the capability to understand the breadth and scope of threats, with the 
capability to dismantle those threats” (Council on Foreign Relations, 2009). Although as 
this statement is a clear recommendation for the FBI to be formally considered the 
National Security Organization for the United States, it goes beyond the scope of this 
research.  But more importantly, Director Mueller’s statement reflects an understanding 
which aligns with the results of this comparative study of the UK and French systems—
the core function of any security service is the ability to effectively mesh domestic 
intelligence and law enforcement.   
The FBI has made great strides in becoming a security service, but one can argue 
its transformation is not complete. The most critical lesson for the U.S. in considering the 
models of the UK and France is that the two functions must be ever so closely integrated 
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and coordinated.  Whether or not that can be done in the U.S. by either separating or 
combining these functions remains to be answered, but the evidence suggests that either 
model will present unique challenges.  The fact that the U.S. has roughly 87,000 police 
departments (Sims & Gerber, 2005) and 16 members of its intelligence community 
presents enormous integration challenges (Lowenthall, 2006). As well, privacy issues, 
public expectations, and political consequences of enhanced domestic collection are all 
important issues that must be considered.  As highlighted by former National Security 
Adviser Condoleezza Rice, “America is allergic to domestic intelligence” (CNN.com, 
2004, p. 11).  Although as Sims and Gerber’s note in their book, Transforming U.S. 
Intelligence, “Americans have demonstrated that they will make exceptions for 
intelligence when national security is at stake…the use of extraordinary intelligence 
capabilities become justified in the public mind when the state is at risk” (2005, p. 36).  
Given the number of considerations needed, the determination of whether to separate or 
combine intelligence and law enforcement will not be easily answered.   
B. HOW THE SECURITY MODELS OF UNITED KINGDOM AND FRANCE 
LOOK, THINK, AND ACT 
1. United Kingdom: Decentralized, Reactive and Proactive Through 
Integration with Law Enforcement Agencies, and Maturing Level of 
Resilience 
The United Kingdom’s domestic security model centers on MI-5, which serves as 
the system’s nerve center.  Created in 1909 to counter threats to the national security of 
the United Kingdom BSS, as a purely domestic intelligence service, has always been 
proactive, agile, and resilient.  Evidenced by one of its primary goals, which is to identify 
and penetrate emerging threats.  However, as the service has stood at the center of the 
United Kingdom’s domestic security apparatus since its inception, BSS is inherently 
centralized evidenced by its core mission of managing and directing all national security 
matters from its London-based headquarters.  It was not until the subway attacks of July 
2005 that the service realized the extent it needed the public’s assistance and the need for 
it to decentralize and operate in the public domain.  As a result, the service began to 
decentralize through the enhancement of the number of Special Branch officers and the 
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creation of regional BSS offices.  Steps conducted in an effort to move beyond the 
London-based headquarters, become more decentralized, agile, resilient, and proactive.   
2. France: Hybrid Decentralized and Centralized, Reactive and 
Proactive Through Combined Law Enforcement and Intelligence 
Functions in One Agency, and Maturing Level of Resilience 
In contrast, France’s domestic security has always rested on more than one 
agency and, as such, is organically more decentralized than centralized.  With the merger 
of Directorate of Territorial Security (DST) and General Intelligence Directorate (RG), 
combined with the unique role of investigating magistrates, France’s security model is 
extremely decentralized.  Furthermore, as a result of the 2008 merger of DST and RG, the 
system has the ability to quickly utilize law enforcement and intelligence tools as 
compared to the United Kingdom system, which must move between agencies to affect 
the same set of tools.   
In considering the resiliency of each security service, it is noteworthy that each 
has undergone extensive organizational change, restructuring, and focus to address 
changing threat environments.  It can be argued which is more resilient, but the important 
thing to remember is that both of these services are charged with countering national 
security threats.  As such, being decentralized, proactive, and resilient seem to be 
inherently important characteristics to these foreign security services and should therefore 
be considered important characteristics to developed in the national security system of the 
United States.   
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V. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS OF INTERVIEWS 
Interviews were conducted as a means to collect qualitative data relevant to the 
questions addressed by this research.  Chapter V provides the results and comprehensive 
analysis of the interview results.  There were four major goals of the interviews:  (1) 
define national security, domestic security, domestic intelligence, and homeland security; 
(2) identify the critical components, functions, and elements of domestic intelligence and 
law enforcement agencies; (3) define the needed relationship between domestic 
intelligence and law enforcement in the United States; and (4) identify the pros and cons 
or separating or combining domestic intelligence and law enforcement function.  Through 
a series of 21 questions, four hand-selected individuals expanded the current dialogue 
regarding national security, specifically whether domestic intelligence needs to be 
separated or combined with law enforcement to best protect the U.S. to against twenty-
first century national security threats.  
The interviewees selected were Mr. James R. Locher, III; Mr. Arthur M. 
Cummings, II; Dr. Bruce Hoffman; and Mr. John O’Connell.  Mr. James R. Locher III, 
Executive Director, Project on National Security Reform, Center for the Study of the 
Presidency, was chosen for his expertise in government reorganization. He played a 
critical role in the reorganization of the DoD which resulted in the Goldwater-Nichols 
Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.  As a result of his current position as Executive 
Director on the Project on National Security Reform, he is in position to offer critical 
insight into contemporary thinking regarding national security reform. Mr. Arthur M. 
Cummings II, Executive Assistant Director, National Security Branch, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation was chosen for his ability to provide a long-term vision for the FBI, 
including the agency’s ongoing transformations, and how he believes the FBI fits into the 
Homeland Security Enterprise.  Dr. Bruce Hoffman, Professor, Georgetown University, 
Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service is a world renowned terrorism expert and 
was chosen for his opinion as to whether the United States is better protected against 
terrorism by a separate or combined model.  Mr. John O’Connell, Deputy Director, 
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), was chosen as he offered not only a strategic 
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and analytical perspective to the issues relating to this research, but he also offered an 
insight into the role NCTC plays with the other national security players.  The questions 
asked of each of these interviewees included:   
1. What do the terms domestic security, domestic intelligence, national 
security, and homeland security mean to you?  
2. Can law enforcement alone address domestic security concerns?  
3. Can intelligence alone address domestic security concerns and, if not, how 
do we ensure these two functions are seamless? 
4. Would you agree that two components of domestic intelligence are: (1) the 
ability to adapt to and identify ever-changing national security threats; (2) 
the ability to process and share this threat information and intelligence.  
Are there other critical components you would include? 
5. How does the current national security system address the nation’s twenty-
first century national security threats and is this the best response?:  
National security threats are defined as those threats that have a national 
impact which transcends state and local boundaries. 
6. What do you think is “broken” in terms of intelligence gathering and 
prosecution related to counterterrorism threats?     
7. What are the advantages and disadvantages of an integrated law 
enforcement and intelligence response? 
8. What are the advantages and disadvantages of a separate law enforcement 
and intelligence response? 
9. What role does state and local law enforcement and homeland security 
personnel play in either approach? 
10. Which approach more effectively ensures state and local entities are 
integrated into the nation’s domestic security enterprise in an effort to 
identify, penetrate and neutralize our national security threats?      
11. Should the United States combine or separate intelligence and law 
enforcement to address the ever-changing national security threats whether 
they are from terrorism, economic fraud and abuse, or violent crime 
spikes? 
12. Do you believe that the FBI or DHS should assume this combined 
intelligence and law enforcement role or should a new agency be created?   
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13. If not, should a new agency be created as the nation’s Domestic Security 
Service and why?     
14. What do you think is the role of FBI under your recommendation and are 
there limitations? 
15. What do you think is the role of DHS under your recommendation and are 
there limitations? 
16. Do you think there is a foreign model or other domestic model that should 
be considered as part of a national security reform effort, and, if so, what 
are the elements of this recommended model? 
17. Who should provide oversight of domestic security in the United States?   
18. Can you recommend any literature (academic and/or government 
documentation) that would add to this discussion? 
19. Have I asked the right questions or should I also be asking other 
questions? 
20. Do you believe that globalization has eliminated the divide between 
international and domestic threats? 
21. Are there others I should talk to in order to get further insight into this 
issue? 
These questions were used as a guide to collect data and generate discussions 
regarding the current national security system, how globalization has changed today’s 
threats, how as a result of these changes the system needs to reform, and whether as part 
of this reform the United States should separate or combine domestic intelligence and law 
enforcement.     
The first goal of the interviews was to determine whether the terms national 
security, homeland security, domestic security, and domestic intelligence are well defined 
and understood.  Notably, all interviewees acknowledged that as a result of an 
interconnected world, security threats now rapidly move across borders creating new 
types of threats, which likely alters the meaning of these terms.  But given this 
recognition, the interviewees lacked a clear and common understanding of the meaning 
of these terms particularly in light of the challenges presented in the twenty-first century.  
In the same way that the reference materials did not articulate a common language, the 
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interviewees similarly did not use these terms suggesting that national security experts 
are not on the same sheet of music.  For instance, homeland security was defined as 
activity that protects the nation, but there was disparity amongst the interviewees as to 
what is meant by protective activity.  As some of the interviewees understood protective 
activity to mean intelligence action that is preventative in nature, while others saw it as 
denoting law enforcement, reactive types of responses.  Additionally, there was not 
agreement on what makes up the world of homeland security—whether it includes only 
man-made threats or an all-hazards approach that encompasses natural disasters.   
Domestic security was not easily defined as it was seen as either exclusively law 
enforcement action or the equivalent of national security, which historically has 
encompassed intelligence activity.  There was evident confusion as to whether domestic 
security encompasses some level of intelligence activity.  As well, one interviewee 
described domestic security as a subset of homeland security but which did not include 
national security; whereas another interviewee saw homeland security as a subset of 
national security but which did not include domestic security.  And as long as there is not 
a clear understanding of the scope, and mission of these disciplines, confusion will likely 
prevail.    
Significantly, there was overwhelming agreement amongst the interviewees that 
globalization has dissipated the line of demarcation between international and domestic 
boundaries, which, in turn, has blurred the line between national and homeland security.  
Mr. Locher referred to the merger of the Homeland Security Council staff into the 
National Security Council staff as a recognition that there is an artificial boundary 
between domestic threats and foreign threats and that this boundary will blur even more 
in the future.  This is noteworthy as it suggests a trend to blur homeland security with 
national security—signaling homeland security as a subset of national security.  
In defining domestic intelligence, the interviewees generally agreed that this 
refers to the collection of intelligence in the continental United States, including 
collection of intelligence on United States citizens.  The interviewees seemed very 
comfortable delineating the difference between domestic intelligence and law 
enforcement.  Most of the interviewees aligned law enforcement with the term domestic 
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security, which they expressed denotes a reactive response versus intelligence—which 
was seen as proactive and preventative collection activity. What was revealed through 
these interviews and the results they produced is that arguably, the only necessary 
security terms are national security, homeland security, and domestic intelligence.  
National security addresses all man-made threats against the United States at home and 
abroad.  Homeland security addresses all natural disasters and non-national-level man-
made threats, infrastructure, and border protection.  Domestic intelligence denotes purely 
proactive and preventative collection activity.  Importantly, if the United States were to 
adopt a combined approach then domestic intelligence would be a subset of national 
security and add a proactive and preventative capability.  If the United States were to 
adopt a separate approach then domestic intelligence would stand apart from national 
security, which would denote a primarily reactive response as the proactive response 
would be the mission of the new domestic intelligence organization.  
The interview results clearly highlighted a critical need, namely the need to create 
a twenty-first century national security doctrine relevant to today’s threat environment 
and security players.  For without such a doctrine, which should define national security, 
domestic security, domestic intelligence, homeland security and law enforcement, any 
discussion held today lacks a common ground leaving discussion participants talking past 
each other.       
An essential requirement in determining whether the United States should 
separate or combine domestic intelligence and law enforcement functions relies on the 
identification of the critical components, functions, and elements of domestic intelligence 
and law enforcement agencies.  This research relied in part, on the interviewees making 
these determinations.  The interviewees appeared to have a much easier time identifying 
the critical components and functions of intelligence and law enforcement.  For example, 
law enforcement functions were confidently identified as being primarily reactive and 
truth seeking in nature as opposed to intelligence functions, which were identified as 
being more proactive...akin to early warning and identification of threats before they 
strike.  Mr. Cummings articulated the difference in this way, “Intelligence is the 
collection of information to shed light on a problem and law enforcement addresses and 
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fixes the problem.”  Drawing a clear distinction between these two disciplines, he 
described law enforcement personnel are much more oriented towards solutions, as 
opposed to intelligence personnel who are singularly focused—collection with limited 
action.   
Resoundingly, the interviewees opined that neither function operating 
independently best protects the nation, but that there is a critical need for these functions 
to work and act in unison.  This strong belief articulated by all of the interviewees 
inherently endorsed the need for a National Security Organization, which would by 
seamlessly integrate domestic intelligence and law enforcement actions. More 
specifically, Mr. O’Connell noted that law enforcement efforts need a concrete target—
something clearly defined to direct its efforts against, as opposed to intelligence which is 
more agile and nebulous by nature.  As today’s threat picture is not as clearly defined as 
decades past, he opined that traditional law enforcement alone will not defeat the threats.  
“Today’s law enforcement function needs an intelligence aspect which encompasses 
broad collection capabilities that inform the law enforcement action.”    
The third goal of the interviews was to define the needed relationship between 
domestic intelligence and law enforcement in the United States.  The interviews produced 
a unanimous conclusion—the need for a seamless and integrated relationship between 
domestic intelligence and law enforcement functions.  As Mr. Cummings noted, 
intelligence collection always presents one question, “So what?”  To him, law 
enforcement’s job is to answer the “So what?” question. All interviewees clearly 
articulated that intelligence informs law enforcement which brings action to the problem. 
One is inextricably necessary to the other. Of note, the interviewees representing 
academia, FBI intelligence and operations, think tanks, and NCTC strategic analysis, all 
presented the same concern—without a seamless relationship between these two 
components the nation is left vulnerable.  As acknowledged by these interviewees, the 
combining of domestic intelligence and law enforcement functions in a single agency 
affords greater opportunities for this necessary integration.   
The fourth goal of the interviews was to identify the pros and cons of separating 
or combining domestic intelligence and law enforcement functions.  Completely 
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unexpectedly, the interviewees overwhelmingly supported a combined approach, as they 
articulated this model better promotes and ensures the nation's security.  Of particular 
concern with the combined approach was the belief that a traditional law enforcement 
organization, like the FBI, will not be capable of developing sufficient intelligence 
capabilities.  On the other hand, each acknowledged that the separate model would 
necessitate the integration of a new security player to the already complex United States 
security landscape.  Of particular interest was Dr. Hoffman’s admission that his support 
of the combined approach is based upon the recent achievements the FBI has made 
towards enhancing its intelligence performance.  Specifically, Dr Hoffman stated that 
several years ago, he would not have thought that the combined model was best for the 
United States.   
But considering the development of the National Security Branch within the FBI, 
its development of an analytical cadre, and its latest intelligence program enhancements 
such as collection management, domain management and more formalized HUMINT 
management, Dr Hoffman opined that not only does the United States need a National 
Security Organization, but that he believes the FBI is the agency best postured to assume 
this role.  Thus, arguably, the FBI is disproving the belief of some that a traditional law 
enforcement agency can develop and hone intelligence capabilities.  The unanimous 
support for a combined approach was surprising given the amount of attention the 
separate model has received in the last nine years.  The consensus among the 
interviewees that the FBI has achieved some signs of transforming into an intelligence 
threat-based agency is an indication that the interviewees are monitoring contemporary 
issues and seeking to remain informed.  This level of engagement is undoubtedly a good 
sign for national security reform as these interviewees are seasoned security professionals 
from the fields of academia, think tanks, national security operations, and national 
security analysis.      
The feedback from the interviewees noted that the questions presented were 
thorough, relevant, and comprehensive.  Moreover, the interviewees agreed that the 
following 10 criteria identified to judge the success of each approach and discussed 
further in Chapter VI were appropriate:   
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1. The ability to seamlessly integrate intelligence and law enforcement for 
collection and action against national security threats;  
2. The ability to adapt to and identify ever changing national security threats;  
3. The ability to quickly process and share this threat information and 
intelligence across the entire security enterprise, including state and local 
security entities;  
4. That which presents least implementation difficulty;  
5. That which eliminates redundancy across the security enterprise;  
6. That which develops and maintains the highest level of subject matter 
expertise;  
7. That which causes the least amount of disruption to the existing national 
security system; 
8. That which presents the highest degree of political acceptance;  
9. The ability to create disciplined imagination; and  
10. That which promotes positive versus negative competition across the 
national security system.   
Initially, the third criteria did not include the reference to state and local security 
entities.  This addition was provided by Dr. Hoffman and subsequently added to the 
research measurement parameters.   
The interviews provided even additional value through some interviewees’ 
recommendations of supplementary reference materials.  Specifically, Dr. Hoffman 
recommended three reference materials produced by Mr. Phil Heymnn, former Deputy 
Attorney General, Protecting Liberty in an Age of Terror (2005), and Terrorism, 
Freedom and Security: Winning without War (2003), and Terrorism and America: A 
Commonsense Strategy for a Democratic Society (2000).  Additionally, Mr. Locher 
supplied additional reference materials relating to the Project on National Security 
Reform.  These materials provided valuable information regarding the current state of 
affairs of the national security system and dramatic reform possibilities.     
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The interviewees indicated the research topic was relevant, useful, and timely and, 
interestingly, each of them seemed ready to answer the question as to whether the United 
States should separate or combine domestic intelligence and law enforcement.  Their 
resounding answer was for the United States to adopt the combined approach.  
Surprisingly, the interviewees confidently saw the FBI as being a strong national security 
player well into the future but commented that its transformation must continue.  As well, 
security reform was seen as a critical component for the nation’s safety.  But as Dr. 
Hoffman noted, organizational reforms take many years and so it is to be expected that 
the national security system reform will take more time—but as all interviewees noted, 
progress has been made.      
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VI. CRITERIA TO JUDGE APPROACHES AND MATRIX 
The two options considered within the problem statement of this research are to: 
(1) either combine, or (2) separate intelligence and law enforcement at the national level.  
As part of this research, 10 competitive factors were identified for effective national 
security.  The success of each approach was judged on these factors that are identified 
below as follows:   
1. The ability to seamlessly integrate intelligence and law enforcement for 
collection and action against national security threats;  
2. The ability to adapt to and identify ever changing national security threats;  
3. The ability to quickly process and share this threat information and 
intelligence across the entire security enterprise, including state and local 
security entities;  
4. That which presents the least implementation difficulty;   
5. That which eliminates redundancy across the security enterprise;  
6. That which develops and maintains highest level of subject matter 
expertise;  
7. That which causes the least amount of disruption to existing national 
security system;  
8. That which presents the highest degree of political acceptance;  
9. The ability to create disciplined imagination; and  
10. That which promotes positive versus negative competition across the 
national security system.    
Using the process described by Kim and Mauborgne in Blue Ocean Strategy to 
create a eliminate-reduce-raise-create grid, this research produced the identification of 10 
competitive national security factors (2004, pp. 35–37). The goal of this process was to 
identify which option preserved the most positive factors and eliminated the most 
negative factors.  More specifically, the goal was to identify which option more 
effectively: 
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1. Eliminated redundancy and competition;  
2. Reduced the difficulty of implementation and disruption to the current 
system;  
3. Raised the ability to adapt to and identify threats, share intelligence and 
law enforcement information, and the level of political acceptance and 
subject matter expertise; and  
4. Created a disciplined imagination and seamless integration of intelligence 
and law enforcement activities became the better option for the united 
states to adopt.   
Lastly, Kim and Mauborgne’s process for creating what they call a strategy 
canvas (included below) was utilized to generate value curves for each option.  These 
value curves identified measurable scores for each option relating to the 10 competitive 
factors (2005, pp. 25–28). Although admittedly subjective, this process served to build a 
framework to judge each option.  When plotted along a low to high axis, the research 
produced the following results:   
1. The combined model ensures a greater degree of integration of 
intelligence and law enforcement functions as this approach has one less 
security player and places these two functions within one agency;  
2. Information sharing between law enforcement and intelligence is 
increased as it is easier to occur within one agency than between different 
agencies;  
3. Implementation, disruption, and redundancy is reduced as the United 
States currently combines these functions in the FBI so there is less to 
implement which inherently reduces disruption. One less new agency 
creates a greater change for clearer lines of mission, thus inherently 
reducing redundancy;  
4. Finally, negative competition is reduced as again, there are less security 
players involved.  However, to significantly reduce negative competition 
today’s security players must build greater trust between themselves.   
In contrast, the separate approach ensures a greater degree of subject matter 
expertise and an ability to adapt to and identify threats as a result of the single mission of 
intelligence services, which nurtures unique and tailored expertise and unencumbered and 
focused collection activities.  Arguably, the separate approach offers a greater degree of 
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disciplined imagination as Mr. O’Connell noted, intelligence services are nebulous by 
nature as they traditionally operate in the cover of night—covertly.  This environment 
encourages and at times demands uninhibited collection activities.  As a result, thinking 
outside the box is not a foreign concept—law enforcement, on the other hand, is much 
more tightly and closely regulated as it operates openly.    
In summary, the matrix depicted below which was developed as a result of upon 
identifying competitive factors relating to the two approaches and determining which of 
these factors needed to be eliminated, reduced, raised, and created, supports a strong 
recommendation for a combined approach.     
 
 
Figure 3.   Strategy Canvas 
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VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
The United States does not have enough blood on the wall 
(Anonymous Former Israeli Intelligence Officer) 
The goal of this research was to determine how the national security system better 
protects the nation in the twenty-first century.  As the nation’s threats are borderless, 
adaptive, and complex, the United States’ security system needs the ability to quickly 
translate covert intelligence into law enforcement action, creating both a proactive and 
reactive response to twenty-first century threats.  
In achieving this goal, the research addressed three critical questions, namely:  
1. Should the United States separate domestic intelligence and law 
enforcement functions by creating a new domestic agency, or combine 
these functions, thereby officially creating a National Security 
Organization?  
2. Is there a need to define the terms national security, domestic security, 
domestic intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland security in a new 
security doctrine to ensure a common language and clear and accepted 
definitions? 
3. How does the new domestic intelligence agency or the national security 
organization need to look, think and act to best address twenty-first 
century threats?    
To answer these questions this research collected data through interviews, 
analyzed existing literature, detailed a comparative study of the domestic intelligence and 
security services of the United Kingdom and France, and developed a matrix to judge the 
success of each approach.   
Of serious concern, still nine years after 9/11 the question as to whether the 
United States should separate or combine domestic intelligence and law enforcement 
remains to be definitively answered.  This research sought to confidently answer this 
question once and for all while simultaneously determining how to leverage the country’s 
massive security assets—both intelligence and law enforcement—to address these 
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threats. Focusing on this first question reveled a need to determine the current level of 
understanding of the following security terms:  national security, domestic security, 
domestic intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland security.  As a result of the 
interviews it became clear that intelligence, security, and law enforcement experts do not 
share a common understanding of the definition of these terms. Therefore, it is 
recommended that a new security doctrine be developed to better define these terms and 
ensure today’s security experts are not talking past one another.  The following are 
definitions recommended by this research:   
1. National Security and/or Domestic Security (these terms should be 
interchangeable)—the proactive and reactive response to all man-made 
threats capable of exhibiting a national level impact and directed against 
the United States or interests of the United States that emanate from 
overseas or within United States territories;  
2. Domestic Intelligence—the efforts by government organizations to gather, 
assess, and act on information about individuals or organizations in the 
United States or U.S. persons elsewhere that are not related to the 
investigation of a known past criminal act or specific planned criminal 
activity (Jackson, 2009, p. 3);  
3. Law Enforcement—the reactive tool to determine whether elements of a 
crime are present and whether they can be associated with a given set of 
facts (Sims & Gerber, 2005, p. 268); and  
4. Homeland Security—the proactive and reactive response to all natural 
disasters and the management of the nation’s infrastructure, immigration, 
and border programs to promote resiliency and maximum protection 
(Homeland Security Council, 2007, p. 1).  
To further answer the question of separating or combining functions, the 
intelligence and security services of two foreign governments—the United Kingdom, 
which separates domestic intelligence and law enforcement functions in different 
agencies, and France, which combines the two—were studied to compare and contrast the 
approaches utilized to determine the best approach for the United States.  The study 
strongly suggested that the core function of any security service is the ability to 
effectively mesh domestic intelligence and law enforcement, whether through the 
leveraging of shared relationships as in the United Kingdom or as a result of the same  
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entity having the ability to gather and act on sensitive information as in France.  Notably, 
the security systems of both countries have undergone dramatic reform in the twenty-first 
century to better integrate these two critical functions.   
1. The United Kingdom created Special Branches, regional offices, and the 
executive liaison group (Smith, 2009).  
2. Whereas, France merged the Directorate of Territorial Security (DST), the 
former domestic intelligence agency and General Intelligence Directorate 
(RG), the intelligence agency within the national police, to create a 
domestic intelligence agency responsible for counterespionage, and 
counterterrorism threats, akin to the FBI.  Although this comparative study 
was instructive to the question addressed by this research, given the size 
and scope of the U.S. security system, it did not alone provide a 
conclusive recommendation as to which option is best for the United 
States.   
Finally, in addressing this first question, all of the data produced from the 
literature review, comparative study, and interviews was synthesized.  Surprisingly, the 
research produced a strong recommendation for the United States to combine domestic 
intelligence and law enforcement in a national security organization—the FBI.  Although 
there were pros and cons identified for both options, the pros for the combined approach 
clearly outweighed the cons.   
Within the 9/11 Commission Report, it was strongly asserted that a new agency 
would divert the attention of the officials most responsible for current counterterrorism 
efforts, thus making the homeland vulnerable.  Additionally, as information sharing is 
already difficult, adding a new agency and players to the arena makes it even more 
difficult (9/11 Commission, 2004, pp. 423–424). Rand’s Dr. Treverton noted that one of 
the more significant pros of the combined approach is its ability to ensure “a grain to 
bread” response to threats (“Reorganizing U.S. Domestic Intelligence, Assessing the 
Options,” 2008, p. 71). One interviewee, who has keenly focused his efforts on the study 
of national and international terrorism, acknowledged that just a few years ago he would 
not have been comfortable placing this critical responsibility in the FBI.  But he noted 
that the FBI’s recent transformation within its National Security Branch, to include the  
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creation of collection management capabilities, domain management capabilities, and 
HUMINT management capabilities—all significant intelligence enhancements—have 
served to remove his doubt.   
Turning to the third question—how the national security organization needs to 
look, think, and act differently to best protect the nation in the twenty-first century—this 
research reached into principles found outside the “normal” realm of national security 
and looked for new opportunities applicable to making the nation safe in the twenty-first 
century (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005, p.4).  Most experts agree that the current national 
system is ill-designed to meet the diversity presented by today’s threats, which move 
across international and national borders faster than the current system can keep pace.  
Current intelligence flow between the multiple agencies is hampered by a vertical 
structure.  And without dispute, due to globalization and fast-paced technology, many of 
today’s threats are so complex they cannot be addressed effectively by single 
organizations.   
As such, the national security system needs to look, think, and act like a 
community, akin to Gercenser et al.’s megacommunity (2008).  This requires a new form 
of leadership, wherein “leaders and members deliberately come together across national, 
organizational, and sectoral boundaries” breaking down barriers to address today’s 
complex security threats and problems.  (Gercenser el al., 2008, p. 28).  In essence, the 
collaborative environment created by a megacommunity dissolves stove-piped authority 
lines of existing agency   
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Figure 4.   Megacommunities 
Department agency heads and instead fuses leadership influence across the 
system.  A collective as opposed to competitive response to security threats is 
encouraged.  As well, this approach ensures an “us” versus “them” mentality and creates 
an environment conducive to creating a thinking mindset and co-created solutions 
(Gerencser el al., 2008, p. 86). The adoption of a megacommunity approach offers an 
immediate solution to the needs of today’s national security system reform—the 
elimination of existing limitations presented by vertical command structures, redundancy, 
and competition that plague the current system and still thrive nine years after 9/11. 
Under this approach, each agency within the security system brings both influence and 
action to the overall mission of the megacommunity—national security.  As a result of 
being interconnected, national security assets are aligned, integrated and deployed against 
the nation’s priority national security threats from a collective perspective rather than 
from the more narrow perspective of any one agency (Gerencser el al., 2008, pp. 53, 56–
57).  As a result, the goals and objectives of the government are better addressed.  
Relationships between federal, local, and private sector entities are strengthened and as a 
result, missions are clear.  As each agency’s role and function are more fully recognized 








        
 





the success of any megacommunity is the ability of its members to embrace Brafman and 
Beckstrom’s starfish characteristic.  The national security megacommunity is no 
exception and will need to develop and maintain an ability to change and redirect its 
efforts against an ever-changing threat.  Much like a starfish, the system must continue to 
evolve against ever changing threats so as not to become stagnant and irrelevant.  As Al 
Qaeda has evolved, so must the United States national security system.  
This suggested realignment is dramatic, as today’s security players arguably fail 
to acknowledge they are part of a larger interconnected system.  The practice of 
competition within the system continues to be nurtured and rewarded which serves to 
maintain stove piped and disconnected security assets.  This practice must be abolished 
and replaced with a singly focused mentality—one team one fight.  Relationships 
between the nation’s security assets must be built on trust, sincerity, and empathy.  The 
thought of asking security players to develop relationships built on sincerity is a bit 
unfamiliar, but as Pink (2006) opines in his book, A Whole New Mind, such 
characteristics are necessary to survive in this globally driven world.  Empathy, 
storytelling, and innovation are today’s new security tools (Pink, 2006, pp. 65–67). 
Information control must be replaced by information sharing.  The top down, stove-piped 
structures must be replaced by a unified security community.  Bureaucratic and 
hierarchical structures must evolve into hybrid networks with distributed power that 
promotes innovation, agility and adaptability.   
This reform will not happen overnight, as it has taken decades to build the walls 
of today’s national security system.  Adding to this challenge—the nation’s security 
assets will need to learn, unlearn, and relearn in order to look, think, and act as a 
megacommunity (Toffler, n.d.).  Though the stakes are high and only getting higher, the 
U.S. security system’s players must prove wrong the stark statement made by the 
anonymous Israeli Intelligence Officer that there is not yet enough “blood on the walls” 
for America to make the necessary change.   
Recommendations from this thesis research are: 
1. Combine domestic intelligence and law enforcement functions and 
formally create a national security organization—the FBI. 
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2. Define national security, domestic security, domestic intelligence, law 
enforcement, and homeland security for the twenty-first century in a new 
security doctrine to create a common language and understanding of these 
critical security terms.  
3. Change the mindset and culture of the current national security players so 
as to transform the system into a megacommunity. 
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